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Pippa Browde* 
This article examines a portion of a relatively new federal tax statute, the 
Tribal General Welfare Exclusion (TGWE), that allows qualified individuals an 
exclusion from gross income for payments received from American Indian/Alaska 
Native tribes for any “Indian general welfare benefit.” Indian general welfare 
benefits are payments made to tribal members by the tribe pursuant to an Indian 
tribal government program for the promotion of general welfare, such as for 
health, education, or housing. The TGWE is intended, in part, to promote partici-
pation in American Indian tribal cultural and ceremonial practices. To that end, 
Indian general welfare benefits include payments made for participation in “cul-
tural or ceremonial activities for the transmission of tribal culture.” The statute 
expressly states that excludable welfare benefits cannot be “lavish and extrava-
gant,” but it does not define what lavish and extravagant means. 
This article makes the following contributions: It is the first piece of legal 
scholarship to examine the new TGWE, and it provides in depth description and 
explanation of the provision. The article also brings attention to federal tax en-
forcement on certain transfers between tribes and tribal members, particularly 
those transfers that occur in the scope of tribes engaging in cultural, ceremonial, 
or religious practices. This article also analyzes a particular limitation in the 
language of the TGWE, that transfers from tribes to tribal members may not be 
“lavish and extravagant,” and makes policy recommendations as to the interpre-
tation of that language as the IRS and consulted tribes move forward with inter-
pretative guidance. Finally, on a broader level, this article seeks to contribute to 
the greater conversations about tribal self-determination and self-governance 
and the role federal tax law plays as an instrument of those federal Indian poli-
cies. 
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This article proceeds as follows: Part I provides background on the genesis 
and evolving history of federal Indian policy and the history and general state of 
federal taxation in Indian country. Part I also explains the TGWE in detail and 
other pertinent federal tax doctrines and the canons of construction that apply in 
federal tax law and federal Indian law. Part II analyzes the meaning of the lavish 
and extravagant standard and how, or to what extent, the limitation prohibiting 
transfers of benefits that are lavish and extravagant aligns with current federal 
Indian policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This article examines a portion of a relatively new federal tax statute, the 
Tribal General Welfare Exclusion (TGWE), that allows qualified individuals an 
exclusion from gross income for payments received from American Indi-
an/Alaska Native tribes for “any Indian general welfare benefit.”1 Indian gen-
eral welfare benefits are payments made to tribal members by the tribe pursuant 
to an Indian tribal government program for the promotion of general welfare, 
 
1  I.R.C. § 139E(a) (2018). I.R.C. § 139E(a) represents codification of the Tribal General 
Welfare Exclusion Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113–168, 128 Stat. 1883 (2014). Unless other-
wise stated, reference to the TGWE is to the codified version of the exclusion. The statutory 
exclusion is different from an exclusion from gross income for general welfare payments 
made by tribes that existed as agency-made law prior to the enactment of the statutory exclu-
sion. Any references to the pre-statutory exclusion will be explicit. The Tribal General Wel-
fare Exclusion Act itself contains uncodified language that is discussed throughout this arti-
cle. References to the uncodified language will also be explicit and refer to the Tribal 
General Welfare Exclusion Act itself. 
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such as for health, education, or housing.2 The TGWE is intended, in part, to 
promote participation in American Indian tribal cultural and ceremonial prac-
tices. To that end, Indian general welfare benefits include payments made for 
participation in “cultural or ceremonial activities for the transmission of tribal 
culture.”3 The statute expressly states that excludable welfare benefits cannot 
be “lavish or extravagant,” but it does not define what lavish and extravagant 
means.4 
Because this article analyzes a legal issue at the intersection of both federal 
tax law and federal Indian law, a note on terminology is necessary at the outset. 
Terms used throughout this article include “federal Indian law,” “Indian tribes,” 
and “Indians.” Federal Indian law refers to “the primary mechanism for mediat-
ing the resulting intergovernmental relationships among the Indian nations, the 
United States, and the states of the Union.”5 This article will refer to Indian 
tribes or Indian nations, which “refer to . . . indigenous North American 
group[s] with which the United States has established a legal relationship.”6 
There is no “single, all-purpose definition” of Indian tribe.7 In the context of 
federal Indian law, Indian tribe refers to “a group of native people with whom 
the federal government has established some kind of political relationship 
. . . .”8 For native people, the term Indian tribe connotes “shared language, ritu-
als, narratives, kinship or clan ties, and a shared relationship to specific land.”9 
Indian tribes are more than political sovereigns. They are also cultural and reli-
gious sovereigns. The term “Indian tribe” is important in the context of the 
analysis in this paper because the tax exclusionary provision applies to certain 
payments made by Tribes to their members.10 
“The term ‘Indian’ refers either to a member of such a tribe or a person 
with some specified relationship to such a tribe.”11 Although there has been a 
 
2  Id. § 139E(b). The payments may be made in kind or in the form of provision of services, 
and the recipient may also be a spouse or dependent of a tribal member. Id. 
3  Id. § 139E(c)(5). The statute speaks of “items of cultural significance, reimbursement of 
costs, or cash honorarium for participation in cultural or ceremonial activities for the trans-
mission of tribal culture . . . .” Id. 
4  Id. § 139E(b)(2)(B)–(D). The only additional requirements, not specifically at issue for 
this research, are that the payments be made pursuant to specific guidelines and may not dis-
criminate in favor of the members of the governing body of the tribe. Id. § 139E(b)(1). 
5  COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 1 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012) [hereinaf-
ter COHEN’S]. Note that Indian law issues may require analysis of multiple sources of law 
extending over various legal jurisdictions, including federal law, tribal law, and state law. 
6  Id. § 3.01. 
7  Id. § 3.02[1]. 
8  Id. § 3.02[2]. Federal recognition of a tribe, as opposed to tribes only recognized by a state 
or not recognized at all, lack the formal relationship with the U.S. A formal process exists 
for tribes seeking federal recognition, including a petitioning process. See id. at § 3.02[1] 
nn.2–3 and accompanying text. 
9  Id. § 3.02[2]. 
10  I.R.C. § 139E(b) (2018). 
11  COHEN’S, supra note 5, at § 3.01. 
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trend in referring to tribal members as “Native American” or “Indigenous,” 
people on reservations use the term “Indians” to refer to American indigenous 
people as a group.12 Again, there is no universal definition of an individual In-
dian, but a general definition has two qualifications: first, that the ancestors of 
the individual lived in the United States prior to European contact, and second, 
the individual is recognized by a tribe or community as such.13 A person may 
be considered Indian for one purpose, but not for another, depending on the 
purpose for which identity as an Indian is relevant.14 Furthermore, the defini-
tions of what makes an individual “Indian,” may vary between tribes. Tribes 
have the power to determine their own membership.15 The inquiry as to who 
constitutes an Indian for purposes of the exclusion from gross income of certain 
transfers from an Indian tribe for the most part depends on membership in the 
tribe.16 Who constitutes a member of a tribe is relevant to this article because 
tribal membership determines who is exempt from federal taxation on certain 
payments by a tribe.17 
The TGWE is intended to address aspects of the troubled history of federal 
tax enforcement on transactions in Indian country. The following anecdotes 
highlight concerns of tribes regarding federal tax enforcement within the sphere 
of cultural and religious observation of tribal nations.18 
Consider, for example, the Pueblo of Jemez in Northern New Mexico that 
has a tradition celebrating with feast days.19 The feast day is publicly an-
 
12  Nell Jessup Newton, Memory and Misrepresentation: Representing Crazy Horse, 27 
CONN. L. REV. 1003, 1003 n.1 (1995). 
13  COHEN’S, supra note 5, at § 3.03[1] n.2 and accompanying text. 
14  Id. § 3.03[1]. 
15  Id. § 3.03[3] n.25 and accompanying text. 
16  The statute defines the excludable payment as one that is made, “to or on behalf of a 
member of an Indian tribe (or any spouse or dependent of such a member)[.]” I.R.C. 
§ 139E(b) (2018). Published guidance from the IRS also gives the example where benefits 
for members to attend “educational, social, or cultural programs offered or supported by the 
tribe or another tribe” may qualify for the exclusion. Rev. Proc. 2014–35, 2014-26 I.R.B. 
1110, § 5.02(2)(e)(v). 
17  See I.R.C. § 139E(b) (exempting from gross income certain transfers from Indian tribal 
governments made “to or on behalf of a member of an Indian tribe.”). 
18  The following three examples were taken from congressional testimony prior to the en-
actment of the TGWE. They were raised by Tribal leaders and/or congressional leaders. See 
New Tax Burdens on Tribal Self-Determination: Hearing Before the Comm. on Indian Af-
fairs, 112th Cong. 48 (2012) [hereinafter Hearings]. 
19  This scenario was described by Senator Udall during congressional testimony. Id. at 45 
(question posed by Senator Udall in response to the statement of Christie J. Jacobs, Director, 
Office of Indian Tribal Governments, Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Department of the 
Treasury). The TGWE is intended to promote Native American culture. Feast days incorpo-
rate elements of historical Catholic religious significance, brought by missionaries to New 
Mexico. As explained: 
[F]east days are as much a celebration of ancient Native American traditions and heritage as they 
are commemorations of Catholic saints. Feast days include traditional dances, cultural activities, 
food, and arts and crafts. Each dance tells a different story and serves a unique purpose. Every 
dance is considered a prayer, not a performance, and as such, outsiders are privileged to observe 
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nounced, and a single household of tribal members will host a meal, feeding up 
to 200 people.20 To help with the expense incurred by the family of tribal 
members who are of modest means, the Jemez Tribe will make a cash distribu-
tion to the family.21 On an audit of the Jemez Tribe, the IRS might take the po-
sition that the payment constituted taxable compensation to the tribal member 
who received the distribution, which would have  required that the Tribe issue a 
Form 1099, an information reporting tax form used to report taxable payments 
greater than $600, to the tribal member who received the distribution.22 This 
would impose tax consequences on the tribal member who received support 
from the tribe and expose the tribe to tax penalties for failing to notify the gov-
ernment of the distribution.23 
Or, as another example, in Pine Ridge, South Dakota, home to the Oglala 
Lakota Sioux Tribe, the family of a deceased tribal elder lacks the money to 
pay for the traditional wake and burial rites. The tribe provides financial sup-
port to the family for the burial costs, which exceed $3,000.24 On audit of the 
tribe, the IRS requires the tribe to issue a Form 1099 to the family, making the 
family subject to income tax on the money provided for the funeral.25 
Yet another example is of the Puyallup Tribe of Indians, a tribe whose res-
ervation lies on an inlet of Puget Sound in Washington, where tribal customs 
include hosting a pow-wow with other tribes “to come together and celebrate 
 
them. Drums beat with an insistent cadence, and the air is filled with the fragrance of piñon 
smoke. . . . Native American feast days allow tribal members to come together in celebration of 
their language, culture and religion. The communities celebrating feast days are open to the pub-
lic, and members of the tribe will prepare a variety of bountiful meals to share with guests. Visi-
tors are often fascinated to see that pueblo life is a window into another world. Not relegated to 
history books or museums, this is a living culture that carries on the centuries-old traditions of 
ancestors. 
Feast Days, VISIT ALBUQUERQUE, https://www.visitalbuquerque.org/about-abq/culture-he 
ritage/native-american/feast-days/ [https://perma.cc/7QHV-RPUV] (last visited Feb. 5,  
2020). 
20  Hearings, supra note 18, at 45 (statement of Sen. Udall about details regarding feast days 
at New Mexico pueblos were used to highlight federal tax enforcement problems in Indian 
Country). 
21  Id. 
22  I.R.C. §§ 6721–24. A payor must submit a Form 1099-Misc to a payee, with a copy sent 
to the IRS, indicating the amount and date of a taxable payment. Id. § 6722. The issuance is 
significant for both the payor and payee. The payor is required under I.R.C. Section 6041(a) 
to issue the information returns and is subject to a penalty for failure to do so, on a per report 
basis. A payee who receives a 1099-Misc. must include the amount reported in gross in-
come, unless otherwise excepted. I.R.C. § 61. There is an administrative process for disput-
ing an erroneously issued Form 1099. The absence of a Form 1099 does not mean that com-
pensation is not includable in the taxable gross income of a recipient, but as a practical 
matter, it makes it more difficult to enforce the inclusion. See I.R.C. § 61(a). 
23  See id. 
24  Hearings, supra note 18, at 5 (statement of Hon. John Yellow Bird Steele, President, 
Oglala Sioux Tribe). 
25  Id. 
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with songs and dances.”26 The Puyallup Tribe’s accounting department must 
issue a Form 1099 to prize winners at the pow-wow, even though the dancing 
“is not their job and the awards are not intended to compensate them for their 
dancing.”27 The monetary awards from the Puyallup Tribe are intended “to cel-
ebrate the very best of those who seek to preserve our culture.”28 
These three examples highlight the types of monetary transfers from an In-
dian tribe for ceremonial and cultural expression that would seem to be exclud-
able from gross income of the recipient as contemplated by the TGWE. And in 
each example, the critical questions remain: What might constitute an accepta-
ble, and therefore excludable for tax purposes, transfer, and what would be 
considered lavish and extravagant? 
The TGWE creates an exclusion from gross income for recipients of Indian 
welfare benefits.29 Revenue loss to the federal government stems from exclu-
sion by the individual that would otherwise be subjected to tax. From a federal 
revenue perspective, the exclusion from gross income under the TGWE for 
transfers to support participation in tribal cultural or ceremonial practices does 
not represent a significant revenue loss to the federal government.30 Despite the 
lack of significant revenue loss, the study of the TGWE is important for two 
reasons. First, in contrast to the minimal revenue at issue, in practice, federal 
tax enforcement efforts have been disproportionately aggressive when it comes 
to transfers between tribes and their members. Second, at the broader policy 
level, the new statute is an example of Congress using federal tax law as a tool 
to promote federal Indian policies and to support tribal sovereignty and tribal 
self-determination. 
If a tribe fails to report taxable payments via Forms 1099 or W2, the tribe 
may be liable for penalties on a per-report basis.31 In the context of tribes, the 
 
26  Id. at 69, 71 (statement of Herman Dillon, Sr., tribal Council Chairman, Puyallup Tribe of 
Indians). 
27  Id. at 71. 
28  Id. Yet, the last example of IRS enforcement on distributions of “winners” at pow-wow 
celebrations are subject to income tax and that the prizes of $600 must be reported on Form 
1099-Miscellaneous, is stated IRS policy. Powwow Prizes Are Taxable, IRS, 
https://www.irs.gov/government-entities/indian-tribal-governments/powwow-prizes-are-
taxable [https://perma.cc/2FKH-4CEN] (last visited Feb. 5, 2020). 
29  I.R.C. § 139E(a) (2018); see infra note 159 and accompanying text. 
30  The TGWE is a tax expenditure, where the foregone revenue to the government is intend-
ed to achieve a social or economic policy goal. Common examples of tax expenditures are 
those that create deductions for social or economic policy, such as tax credits for children of 
parents who are low income or tax deductions for home mortgage interest paid, to promote 
home ownership. I.R.C. § 25A; I.R.C. § 163(h)(3). The author has not been able to find data 
on the revenue loss at issue here. Even assuming data exists on the revenue loss predicted, 
under all applications of the TGWE (meaning tribal welfare benefits for housing, medical, 
education, in addition to benefits for participation in ceremonial or cultural practices), this 
would not detail the revenue loss per category of benefits. The IRS’s Statistics of Infor-
mation has no data on any of the potential revenue loss, as it is difficult to track data on ex-
clusions from gross income as opposed to deductions from gross income. 
31  I.R.C. § 6721(a)(1) (imposing a $100 penalty per return for failure to report). 
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recipient of otherwise excludable tribal general welfare benefits may also be on 
the tribe’s payroll for other roles served within the tribe’s government or other 
tribal entities. According to Indian tribes and their advocates, the IRS has ag-
gressively pursued federal tax enforcement on transfers between tribes and their 
members.32 The unfortunate history of IRS enforcement, through the Indian and 
Tribal Government division (ITG), has led to tribes having to justify distribu-
tions made to their members.33 What this all means is that tribes struggle with 
high enforcement rates and are forced to prove a negative, or that payments or 
distributions are made pursuant to Indian general welfare benefits and not sub-
ject to reporting.34 
Congress and the IRS are aware of the challenges with respect to enforce-
ment of payments by tribes and appear eager to rectify enforcement abuses. 
The uncodified language of the TGWE provides for suspension of examina-
tions and audits of tribal governments and members to the extent such audits 
relate to the exclusion of a payment or benefit from an Indian tribal government 
under the TGWE.35 The uncodified language also provides for waivers of pen-
alties or interest on tribes or individual recipients, until the ITG division of the 
IRS receives statutorily proscribed training and education on how to enforce 
laws in a manner that respects the federal government’s “unique legal treaty 
and trust relationship with Indian tribal governments . . . .”36 Published guid-
ance issued by the IRS after the enactment of the TGWE confirms that the IRS 
itself is aware of the problems with enforcement.37 
 
32  See Hearings, supra note 18, at 47–48 (testimony of Hon. Lynn Malerba, Chief, Mohegan 
Tribe: On behalf of the United South and Eastern Tribes, Inc.) (discussing “widespread con-
cern [of tribes] that the [IRS] examinations and audits of Tribal general welfare program 
benefits are being carried out in a manner that is incompatible with Federal law, treaties, 
trust responsibility, and the self-determination policy.”). The reasons for lopsided enforce-
ment in Indian country are many, but general distrust of tribes as governing entities and the 
history of resentment of tribes and Indians by non-Indians who perceive Indians as receiving 
special benefits are discussed infra Section II.B.1. 
33  Hearings, supra note 18, at 51 (testimony of Hon. Lynn Malerba, Chief, Mohegan Tribe: 
On behalf of the United South and Eastern Tribes, Inc.) (“The IRS has challenged the bene-
fits provided to tribal cultural leaders who participate in activities that transmit tribal culture 
as being taxable compensation for services provided. For a tribal official to have to issue a 
form 1099 to a spiritual leader for the conduct of a traditional ceremony is not only burden-
some, but also culturally offensive.”). 
34  Id. at 40 (testimony of Christie J. Jacobs, Director, Office of Indian and Tribal Govern-
ments, Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Department of Treasury) (noting that tribal social 
programs may come under scrutiny by the IRS when a tribe government is under examina-
tion and payments from a tribe in excess of $600 may not be reported, just as payments made 
pursuant to the TGWE do not have to be reported). 
35  Tribal General Welfare Exclusion Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-168, 128 Stat. 1883 
§§ 3(b)(2), 4(a) (requiring training and education for internal revenue field agents assigned 
to enforce tax laws with respect to Indian tribes). 
36  Id. §§ 3(b)(2)(A), 4(a) (suspending examinations and waiving penalties until training and 
education completed). 
37  Memorandum from the I.R.S. Office of Chief Counsel (Mar. 19, 2015) (on file at https 
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The second reason this topic is relevant is because, as highlighted by the 
language prohibiting lavish and extravagant benefits, the TGWE is an oppor-
tunity to explore the use of tax law as a tool for social policy. In this case, the 
social policy is federal Indian policy. In evaluating the efficacy of the tax poli-
cy to encourage engagement and participation in traditional Indian cultural and 
ceremonial practices, it is necessary to examine what lavish and extravagant 
means. This social policy issue highlights the crux of the problem: the TGWE 
is intended, in part, to promote participation in tribal cultural activities.38 Fed-
eral policy with respect to tribes favors tribal sovereignty and self-
determination.39 Yet the statute, with its express prohibition on transfers that 
are lavish and extravagant, restricts tribal sovereignty, especially with respect 
to promoting tribal culture and ceremonies. 
This article makes the following contributions: it is the first piece of legal 
scholarship to examine the new TGWE, and it provides in depth description 
and explanation of the provision. The article also brings attention to federal tax 
enforcement on certain transfers between tribes and tribal members, particular-
ly those transfers that occur in the scope of tribes engaging in cultural, ceremo-
nial, or religious practices. This article also analyzes a particular limitation in 
the language of the TGWE, that transfers from tribes to tribal members may not 
be “lavish and extravagant,” and makes policy recommendations for the inter-
pretation of that language as the IRS and consulted tribes move forward with 
interpretative guidance. Finally, on a broader level, this article seeks to contrib-
ute to the greater conversations about tribal self-determination and self-
governance and the role federal tax law plays as an instrument of those federal 
Indian policies. 
This article proceeds as follows: Part I provides background on the genesis 
and evolving history of federal Indian policy and the history and general state 
of federal taxation in Indian country. Part I also explains the TGWE in detail 
and other pertinent federal tax doctrines and the canons of construction that ap-
ply in federal tax law and federal Indian law. Part II analyzes the meaning of 
the lavish and extravagant standard and how, or to what extent, the limitation 
prohibiting transfers of benefits that are lavish and extravagant aligns with cur-
rent federal Indian policy. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This part first lays a foundation for the analysis with the history of federal 
Indian law and policy and the general rules of federal taxation in Indian coun-
 
://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/201514022.pdf) (Chief Counsel Advisory opinion dealing with 
extensions of statutes of limitations for claims for refund arising under the TGWE). 
38  See I.R.C. § 139E(c)(5) (2018); see infra notes 158–71 and accompanying text for de-
tailed explanation of the statutory exclusion. 
39  See infra notes 123–46 and accompanying text for an overview of current federal Indian 
policy. 
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try. Next, this part describes the TGWE, the interpretive administrative law re-
garding its administration, and the evolution from uncodified administrative 
rules, including the parallel rules for exclusion of general welfare payments 
made by non-tribal governmental entities. Finally, this part explains the canons 
of construction for Indian law and compares them to those canons generally 
employed for interpreting tax statutes. 
A. The History of Federal Indian Law and Policy 
The analysis of the TGWE lies at the intersection of federal tax law and 
federal Indian law, applying the canons of construction for Indian law, which 
are heavily shaped by the history of federal Indian law and policy. It has been 
written, “[o]ne cannot begin to understand Indian law without acknowledging 
history and the role it continues to play in shaping the body of . . . Federal Indi-
an [law] . . . .”40 One reason the history is particularly important in this context 
is “specific historical events, policy eras, and tribal events can drastically affect 
the way in which Federal Indian Law applies in a particular instance.”41 In ad-
dition to giving context to the canons of construction, the history is necessary 
because federal tax law as an instrument of social policy is being used in this 
case as a tool to effectuate federal Indian policy. The TGWE is not a simple ex-
clusion from gross income but is an opportunity for tribes to make determina-
tions on tribal policy that could have a profound effect on tribal cultural and re-
ligious traditions. As explained in detail in the analysis, the history and policy 
eras in particular weigh heavily in how the ambiguous standard of lavish and 
extravagant ought to be construed in favor of, and with deference to, Indian 
tribes.42 
For those reasons, this article outlines the so-called “eras” of federal Indian 
policy. Two qualifications are necessary. First, this article provides only the 
barest background on the history of federal Indian law and policy. Entire vol-
umes are devoted to the history of government-to-government dealings be-
tween the United States and Indian nations.43 The following is but a highly 
condensed overview of the relationship between Indian nations and the Europe-
 
40  Monte Mills, Why Indian Country? An Introduction to the Indian Law Landscape, INDIAN 
L. & NAT. RESOURCES: BASICS & BEYOND 1, 2 (2017); see also COHEN’S, supra note 5, at 
§ 1.01 n.4 and accompanying text (“Historical perspective is of central importance in the 
field of Indian law.”). 
41  Mills, supra note 40, at 2; see also Hearings, supra note 18, at 71. 
42  See infra Section I.D. 
43  See also DAVID E. WILKINS & K. TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN GROUND: AMERICAN 
INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW 10–11 (2001) (examining the tribal-federal rela-
tionship “through the lens of six critical doctrines of U.S. law: the doctrine of discovery, the 
trust doctrine, the doctrine of plenary power, the reserved rights doctrine, the doctrine of im-
plied repeals, and the doctrine of sovereign immunity.”). See COHEN’S, supra note 5, at 
§§ 1.01–1.07. 
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ans who emigrated to the Americas over the last 500 years.44 Second, the his-
torical policy “eras” outlined represent generalized policy shifts, and “are diffi-
cult to demarcate with great precision.”45 Thus, this section serves to outline the 
general contours of history most pertinent to the construction of the statutory 
provision at issue in this article. 
1. Precolonial Times to the 1830s 
The foundation for the legal relationship between tribes and the federal 
government was set during the years beginning with initial contact between 
tribes and European settlers through the early part of the nineteenth century. 
Starting from the initial contact, European settlers were focused on purchasing 
land from and establishing favorable trade relations with Tribes and individual 
Indians.46 Spanish and British colonial law and other European legal traditions 
set the foundation for how colonists interacted with tribes.47 Based on these le-
gal traditions, some colonists respected tribes as sovereign entities that had 
property rights, so it was a matter for colonial governments to negotiate acqui-
sitions.48 These legal principles were embodied in treaties between various 
tribes and England, Spain, Holland, and France.49 Despite these principles that 
supported government-to-government dealings, colonists did not wholehearted-
ly respect tribes as equal, and certainly colonists did not treat individual Indians 
as equal.50 Tensions between European governments and colonists and the 
tribes heightened as the colonists, believing Indians to be inferior, sought to ap-
ply the doctrine of discovery to seize tribal lands and engaged in deceitful 
methods for acquiring Indian land.51 
After the Revolutionary War, the tension between tribes as sovereigns ver-
sus notions of conquest was not the only legal and political tension. For the 
colonists, the fight over which government, local versus more centralized, had 
 
44  The author is mindful that while this summary of history may be “necessarily contrived 
and ultimately somewhat artificial,” it is important context. Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Self-
Determination at the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV. 777, 777–78 (2006). According to Pro-
fessor Washburn, explanation of the “eras” in history “serves as useful shorthand for under-
standing the vicissitudes of American Indian policy.” Id. at 778. 
45  Id. To quote Cohen’s, “Indian law and history are the opposite sides of the same coin.” 
COHEN’S, supra note 5, at § 1.01. 
46  COHEN’S, supra note 5, at § 1.02[1] nn.47–48 and accompanying text. 
47  Id. § 1.02[1]. 
48  Id. 
49  Id. § 1.02[1] n.52 and accompanying text. 
50  Id. § 1.02[1] nn.56–70 and accompanying text. 
51  See id. For extensive discussion on the doctrine of discovery, the war against tribalism, 
and the racist underpinnings of these theories and histories, see ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, 
SAVAGE ANXIETIES: THE INVENTION OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION 224–25 (2012). 
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the power to deal with Indian affairs became a challenge.52 Ultimately, at the 
Constitutional Convention, the power to “regulate [c]ommerce with foreign 
[n]ations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes,” was re-
served to the federal government via Congress.53 
Despite the language in the federal Constitution regarding federal authority 
to regulate commerce between the U.S. and tribal governments, the scope of 
that power and the contours of tribal sovereignty were tested early in the U.S.’s 
history in disputes between states and tribes. United States Supreme Court ju-
risprudence addressed issues regarding both the tension between tribes as sov-
ereigns versus the doctrine of discovery and federalism versus state authority 
over Indian affairs.54 In a set of three seminal cases, authored by Chief Justice 
John Marshall and referred to as the Marshall Trilogy, the Supreme Court set 
the course for the following eras of Indian law and policy.55 
In the initial case, Johnson v. M’Intosh, the Court addressed the limits of 
tribal sovereignty. In Johnson v. M’Intosh, the Court held that tribes retained 
the right to possess and use their lands, but based on the doctrines of discovery 
and conquest, the United States acquired “absolute ultimate title.”56 While the 
outcome of Johnson v. M’Intosh was a blow to the sovereignty of tribes, it 
highlighted the respect for the treaty tradition between tribes and the federal 
government, and that such treaties “had a moral and legal force that, while not 
always respected, was also not easily ignored.”57 
The second and third cases of the Marshall Trilogy resolved questions 
about the extent to which states could exercise jurisdiction over Indian affairs. 
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the Supreme Court asserted original jurisdic-
tion over a dispute between the Cherokee Nation and the State of Georgia be-
cause the tribe was a “domestic[,] dependent nation.”58 Cherokee Nation estab-
lished the foundation for the federal government trust obligations to tribes.59 
The third case of the Marshall Trilogy, Worcester v. Georgia, also addressed 
state-tribal conflict.60 On the issue of whether Georgia laws applied to the 
 
52  COHEN’S, supra note 5, § 1.02[2] nn.71, 78 and accompanying text. The question over 
which government ought to have the power to control Indian affairs was an issue at the Con-
tinental Congress and in the Articles of Confederation. Id. 
53  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also COHEN’S, supra note 5, § 1.02[3] nn.111–12 and 
accompanying text. Prior proposals under the Constitutional Convention did not give federal 
government over Indian affairs. Id. § 1.02[3]. 
54  See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 595–96 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 562–63 
(1823). 
55  See Worchester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 595–96; Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16; 
M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 562–63. 
56  M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 592. 
57  COHEN’S, supra note 5, at § 1.03[1] n.3 and accompanying text. 
58  Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 13, 17. 
59  Id. at 79. 
60  Worcester, 31 U.S. at 536–38. 
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Cherokee Nation, the Supreme Court held they did not and reaffirmed the su-
premacy of the federal-tribal treaties as supreme law of the land.61 
Several foundational principles from the formative era continue to shape 
Indian law and policy today including that the federal United States govern-
ment has supreme and broad powers over Indian affairs, tribal self-government 
matters are generally reserved for the tribe, states have limited jurisdiction in 
Indian Country, and the U.S. has special trust obligations with respect to 
Tribes.62 
2. Removal and Creation of Reservations (1830s-1870s) 
Despite the promises of the federal government’s trust obligations affirmed 
in Worcester v. Georgia, this era marked a period the federal government began 
to degrade its trust obligations to tribes and Indians. Precipitated by the growth 
of the population of the United States and westward expansion, the federal 
government insisted on extinguishing Indian title to land and forcing Indians to 
move west and onto reservations.63 The federal government stopped purchasing 
land from Indian tribes with permanent annuities and instead created reserva-
tions of land in the western territories.64 Tribes increasingly resisted relinquish-
ing their lands, and the United States forcibly removed Indians to western terri-
tories.65 By the 1850s, “the majority of [] Tribes had been removed from the 
eastern” portion of the United States.66 
In addition to creating reservations for tribes, the federal government began 
to convert the title to Indian land from tribal ownership to ownership by indi-
vidual Indians in what is referred to as allotment.67 Allotment policies reflected 
European ideals of individual property rights, but they also reflected a broader 
cultural and societal belief that Indians ought to be assimilated into mainstream 
culture.68 The policies of removing tribes from their land and forcing them on 
to reservations, or converting tribally or communally owned lands into private-
 
61  Id. at 559–60. 
62  See COHEN’S, supra note 5, § 1.03[3]. As discussed, infra Section I.A.6, these principles 
and policies have vacillated over the years, but they remain relevant for the current Indian 
law and policies of self-determination and self-governance. 
63  COHEN’S, supra note 5, § 1.03[4][a]; see also id. § 1.03[4][a] n.134 and accompanying 
text. 
64  Id. § 1.03[6][b] n.290 and accompanying text. 
65  Id. § 1.03[4][a] n.206 and accompanying text; see also id. § 1.03[6][a] nn.276–81 and ac-
companying text. Historically, the California gold rush of the 1850s and the Oregon Trail 
wagon route of the 1840s marked European immigrants’ move to the western part of the 
United States. Westward Expansion, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/westward- 
expansion (last visited Feb. 16, 2020). 
66  Id. §§ 1.03[4][a] n.206, 1.03[6][a] n.281 and accompanying text. 
67  Id. § 1.03[6][b]. 
68  Id. § 1.03[6][b] n.285 and accompanying text. This was not just about property ownership 
but also had racist motivations on behalf of the European immigrants who were attempting 
to “civilize,” the Indian population. Id. 
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ly held lands, set the tone for what became continued disrespect for tribes, Indi-
ans, and the Indian way of life.During this period, the federal government es-
tablished the Department of the Interior and created the position of the Secre-
tary of the Interior to supervise matters of Indian affairs.69 The Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (BIA) would come to shape policy for years to come.70 
At the end of the Removal and Reservation Era, the federal government 
ceased engaging in government-to-government treaties with tribes and began 
legislating all Indian policy.71 No longer engaging in treaties with tribes, will-
ingness to break promises of the trust obligations and remove Indians from 
their lands and force them westward onto reservations all foreshadowed the 
coming era of policy. 
3. Allotment and Assimilation Era (1870s-1930s) 
Post-Civil War, the broader society was shifting with development of the 
trans-national railroad and further western expansion.72 Coupled with rapid in-
dustrialization, there was an escalating tension between mainstream society and 
the traditional hunter-gatherer and nomadic ways of Indian tribes.73 The prior 
era foreshadowed the harsh policies to come where the federal government fur-
ther eroded tribal existence. 
The most notable policy proscription (and the one for which the era is 
named) came from The General Allotment Act of 1887 or Dawes Act. The 
Dawes Act represented a congressional attempt to fully change the role of Indi-
ans in American society by changing the ownership structure of tribal land.74 
The Dawes Act was intended to increase Indian-held land for productive use by 
tribal members surrendering their undivided interest in tribally owned or trust 
land for personally assigned individual interest or an allotment, generally to be 
held in trust for a number of years.75 Though the prior era had policies support-
ing allotment, it became mandatory under the Dawes Act.76 The Dawes Act re-
duced the number of acres held by tribes from 138 million to forty-eight mil-
lion within fifty years of enactment.77 
The communal ownership of land represented the Indian way of life, and 
thus the Dawes Act was not just about changing who owned the land. It also 
represented federal policy to alter the traditional, communal ways of Indian 
 
69  Id. § 1.03[4][b]. 
70  Id. §§ 1.04–1.07. 
71  Id. § 1.03[9]. 
72  Id. § 1.04. 
73  Id. § 1.04 n.3 and accompanying text. 
74  Id. § 1.04. 
75  Id. 
76  Id. § 104 n.7 and accompanying text. 
77  Id. § 1.04 n.8 and accompanying text. 
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life.78 In assimilation, the federal government was trying to make the “Ameri-
can Indian” into an “Indian American.”79 But assimilating Indians into white 
culture required more than transferring title to land.80 Federal law also outlawed 
traditional Indian conduct, and instead required substitution of European cul-
tural norms.81 Tribal religious practices such as traditional dances and oral sto-
rytelling traditions were criminalized.82 The federal government instituted pro-
grams to give assimilation lessons to Indian children or move them off-
reservation altogether, often at religious mission schools, and prohibited use of 
native languages.83 During this era, “coercive attempts at assimilation were ap-
plied to almost all aspects of Indian’s lives,” including federal oversight over 
the appropriate length for hair to be worn, funeral rites, hunting, fishing, meth-
ods for slaughtering animals, and even appropriate names for people.84 The 
federal government encouraged Indians to abandon hunting and gathering tradi-
tions and instead engage in agriculture.85 
As Indian land was allotted, pre-contact farming methods were not sustain-
able.86 The U.S. policies of the allotment era caused serious problems for Indi-
an people including starvation, spread of disease, and declining health.87 In 
recognition of the declining humanitarian conditions in Indian Country, by the 
end of the allotment and assimilation era, the BIA was granted general authori-
zation to support the welfare of Indians.88 
4. Indian Reorganization (1934-early 1950s) 
The failures of the allotment era and attempts to assimilate individual Indi-
ans into mainstream society precipitated a policy shift that corresponded with 
the New Deal period in American history. The “catalyst for change” in policy 
was the publication of the Meriam Report, a study conducted over two years by 
 
78  Id. § 1.04. “[A]llotment, or distribution of Indian lands, was coupled with acculturation, 
or change of Indian culture and life ways. . . . It is difficult to deal with each of these various 
issues in isolation.” Id. 
79  Id. § 1.04 nn.16–17 and accompanying text. At the time, the Commissioner of Indian Af-
fairs posited that only one of two outcomes were possible—either the Indian was to become 
“civiliz[ed]” or would face “extermination.” Id. § 1.04. 
80  Id. § 1.04. 
81  Id. Federal criminal jurisdiction was established in Indian Country over major crimes, fur-
ther expanding the reach of the federal government over the lives of Indians. Id. § 1.04. n.23 
and accompanying text. 
82  Id. § 1.04 n.18 and accompanying text. 
83  Id. § 1.04 nn.25–27 and accompanying text (documenting efforts to assimilate children); 
id. § 1.04 n.28 and accompanying text (prohibiting use of native language). 
84  Id. §§ 1.04, 1.04. nn.29–30 and accompanying text. 
85  Id. § 1.04. 
86  Id. 
87  Id. § 1.04 n.31 and accompanying text. 
88  Id. § 1.04 n.32 and accompanying text. 
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the Brookings Institute, which shed light on the “deplorable living conditions” 
of Indian people.89 
The new era, referred to as Indian Reorganization, was marked by a rever-
sal of the allotment and assimilation policies and was heralded as a mechanism 
to stop the loss of Indian held lands and re-establish tribal governments and 
traditional culture.90 The policies also reflected congressional tolerance of, if 
not respect for, the traditional nature of Indian culture.91 This dramatic reversal 
resulted in “new protections for Indian rights, support for federally defined 
tribalism, and encouragement of historical and anthropological concerns such 
as arts, crafts, native rituals, tourism, and traditional economic systems.”92 
The era of Indian reorganization is named after the defining legislation, the 
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (also known as the IRA or Wheeler-Howard 
Act).93 The objectives of the IRA were to improve economic status of tribes by 
preventing further loss of tribal lands and to assist with tribal land acquisition 
or re-acquisition of land lost through prior allotment.94 The IRA sought to ac-
complish those goals by prohibiting any further allotments and had various 
mechanisms designed to ensure trust protection of tribal lands and prevent 
transfers of restricted tribes.95 
The IRA was not a perfect solution to the woes created by years of policies 
aimed at assimilation. Participation in the IRA was voluntary, and response was 
varied with some tribes refusing to participate.96 The IRA also did not give ab-
solute sovereignty to tribes; instead it allowed tribes to manage all tribal affairs 
subject to BIA approval, creating a tribal government to run as a mini-federal 
government under the federal supervision.97 The BIA continued to have super-
visory approval of almost all Indian actions, limiting tribal autonomy.98 
 
89  Id. §§ 1.05, 1.05 n.2 and accompanying text. 
90  Id. § 1.05 n.1 and accompanying text. 
91  Id. § 1.05. 
92  Id. 
93  Id. § 1.05 n.8 and accompanying text. 
94  Id. § 1.05 nn.8–9 and accompanying text. Other significant legislation of this period in-
cluded the Leavitt Act of 1932 (authorizing the Secretary of Interior to discharge debts of 
tribes for construction work on reservation infrastructure projects), id. § 1.05 n.4 and accom-
panying text, and the Johnson-O’Malley Act of 1934 (allowing the BIA to contract with 
states for basic services to tribes and welfare of tribal members). Id. § 1.05 n.6 and accom-
panying text. 
95  COHEN’S, supra note 5, § 1.05. The IRA also gave tribes various transactional and gov-
ernmental protections, such as permitting tribes to adopt constitutions and form business en-
tities. Id. § 105 n.10 and accompanying text. 
96  Id. § 1.05 n.17 and accompanying text (tribe can reject IRA with majority voting to opt 
out). Tribes who opted out continued under existing tribal government structures or with no 
organized structure. Id. Many larger tribes rejected application of the IRA. Id. § 1.05 n.13 
and accompanying text. 
97  Mills, supra note 40, at 11 (“The Act itself offered little additional authority to tribes be-
yond the inherent sovereign rights they had always enjoyed . . . .”). 
98  COHEN’S, supra note 5, § 1.05. 
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The IRA was successful at stemming the tide on the loss of land from 
tribes and promoting “better and more efficient use” of tribal resources.99 In 
that respect, the IRA was certainly an improvement from the policies of allot-
ment and assimilation, but it was not a fix. Conditions remained challenging, 
and the damage of the prior eras to tribes and individual Indians was not easily 
rectified. Coupled with the economic conditions of the Depression era, the un-
derfunded BIA was unable to provide meaningful relief to destitute conditions 
in Indian country.100 As the United States went into the Second World War, 
with strained economic conditions and lack of optimism about the efficacy of 
the IRA, the pendulum started to move again towards policies that would be 
even more detrimental to tribes and Indian people.101 
5. Termination Era (1950s-1960s) 
Following World War II, the policy pendulum reversed again as Indians 
were “caught . . . [in] post-war economic and political forces demanding less 
government, more independent economic opportunities, reduced federal ex-
penditures, and decentralized local and state operations.”102 Congress relied on 
a study called the “Survey of Conditions Among the Indians of the United 
States,” which disavowed the success of the IRA, particularly with respect to 
how Indian lands and tribal resources and how federal funds were used for trust 
obligations under the IRA.103 The overall policy goal consisted of “termi-
nat[ing] the federal-tribal relationship and perceived special status” of Indians 
in a “gradual and systematic termination,” of tribes as governments.104 Pressed 
by the strains of post-war economic conditions and with the study as empirical 
support, Congress began to work to more fully assimilate individual Indians.105 
This represented a return to the policies from the era of allotment and assimila-
tion and resulted in modification of all existing federal programs under the BIA 
that touched every aspect of Indian life, from tribal land ownership and man-
agement, to natural resource development, to health, education and welfare, and 
even state and federal taxation.106 The legislative proposals of the Termination 
Era were aimed at reducing and substantially modifying the restrictions in the 
IRA, if not eliminating them, and to eliminate the BIA entirely.107 
The Termination Era policy was shaped by both economic and ideological 
forces.108 The economic issues involved interests in developing and accessing 
 
99  Id. 
100  Id. § 1.05 n.20 and accompanying text. 
101  Id. § 1.05. 
102  Id. § 1.06. 
103  Id. § 1.06 nn.3–4 and accompanying text. 
104  Id. § 1.06. 
105  Id. § 1.06 n.4 and accompanying text. 
106  Id. § 1.06 n.7 and accompanying text. 
107  Id. § 1.06. 
108  Id. 
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natural resources within Indian country and on tribal lands and opposition to 
federal budgets for the BIA and Indian programs.109 The ideological forces 
were cultural opposition to the anti-Christian nature of tribal life and religious 
practices.110 
In an early policy statement in favor of terminating tribal governments, 
Congress called for an investigation of the BIA and for proposals to achieve the 
goals of eliminating the federal government’s trust obligation and to ensure 
termination.111 Without waiting for evaluations or individualized study of the 
needs and conditions of tribes,112 Congress quickly passed legislation intending 
the end the federal government’s trust obligations.113 
Congress passed laws that terminated the federal government’s trust obli-
gations with respect to individual tribes.114 Termination essentially amounted to 
the distribution of communally held tribal assets that had been held by the fed-
eral government in trust to individual tribal members.115 The termination bills 
had common features, namely they set periods from two to five years to com-
plete the termination process and prepared final accounting for dividing tribal 
assets among individual Indians.116 
Other federal efforts were made to move Indians off reservations and as-
similate them into mainstream society. For example, a “[v]oluntary [r]elocation 
[p]rogram” was established for defense workers and veterans who were Indian, 
providing travel and subsistence allowance and placing them in jobs off-
reservation.117 Such programs were an overall failure because there were insuf-
ficient or inadequate work opportunities, and once they relocated, there were no 
services to help Indians adjust to the cultural immersion. Many who relocated 
returned to their reservations.118 
The consequences of termination on tribes were devastating, both econom-
ically and culturally. Termination ended federally funded programs for Indians 
and tribes to promote health, education, and welfare, including housing assis-
tance and social programs.119 The loss of tribal lands weakened tribal sover-
eignty because tribes were unable to exercise governmental powers without a 
land base.120 
 
109  Id. 
110  Id. 
111  Id. § 1.06 n.19 and accompanying text. Congressional policy was declared in a 1953 
House Concurrent Resolution. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 67 Stat. B132 (Aug. 1, 1953). 
112  COHEN’S, supra note 5, § 1.06 n.20 and accompanying text. 
113  Id. 
114  Id. § 1.06 n.23 and accompanying text. 
115  Id. § 1.06. 
116  Id. 
117  Id. §§ 1.06, 106 n.12 and accompanying text. 
118  Id. § 1.06, n.13 and accompanying text. 
119  Id. § 1.06. 
120  Id. § 1.06. n.26 and accompanying text. 
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As the federal government ceased to provide its trust obligations, responsi-
bility for all aspects of government support to tribes transferred to the states.121 
Not all tribes were “terminated” by congressional legislation, but even those 
tribes not terminated felt the lasting effect, such as with the changes in criminal 
laws and the de-regulation of Indian lands and resources.122 The ultimate con-
sequences of termination were further degradation of tribal sovereignty, an in-
crease in poverty, and failed assimilation of individual Indians. 
6. Self-Determination and Self-Governance (1960s to Present) 
The Termination Era was short lived in terms of number of years but dev-
astating in the period’s effect on Indian tribes and tribal culture. Starting in the 
early 1960s, the policies supporting New Federalism and the War on Poverty 
were gaining momentum, as was the civil rights movement.123 Parallel policy 
shifts transpired with respect to Indian affairs, increasing acknowledgment of 
the need for stronger relationships between tribes and the federal govern-
ment.124 By the late 1950s, policy leaders began to return to policy goals of the 
Indian Reorganization era.125 
The era of self-governance and self-determination is “premised on the 
principle that Indian tribes are . . . the primary or basic governmental unit of 
Indian policy.”126 Two federal statutes declared and implemented these poli-
cies: the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 
(Self-Determination Act)127 and the Tribal Self-Governance Act of 1994 (Self-
Governance Act).128 The Self-Determination Act allowed tribes to administer 
 
121  Id. § 1.06. With the shift from federal to state governmental support, states imposed leg-
islative authority over all terminated tribes on a broad range of matters including education, 
land use, adoption and state taxation. Id. § 1.06 n.25 and accompanying text. The shift to 
state jurisdiction in Indian Country included key changes in criminal and civil jurisdiction, 
such as passage of Public Law 83-280, known as P.L. 280, which mandated that specific 
states assume such jurisdiction. Id. § 1.06 at n.27 and accompanying text. 
122  Id. § 1.06. 
123  Id. § 1.07. United States presidents articulated the new policies toward Indian affairs. For 
example, President Lyndon Johnson proposed “a new goal for our Indian programs: A goal 
that ends the old debate about ‘termination’ of Indian programs and stresses self-
determination [as] a goal that erases old attitudes of paternalism and promotes partnership 
and self-help.” Id. § 107 n.16 and accompanying text. President Richard Nixon rejected the 
extremism of termination (which “ignore[s] the moral and legal obligations” of the federal 
government with respect to tribes) and paternalism (which he said “ ‘ero[des] . . . Indian ini-
tiatives and morale.’ ”). Id. § 107 n.17 and accompanying text. This evolution of Indian af-
fairs policies was also triggered by a growing national concern for ethnic and racial minori-
ties. Id. § 107 n.4 and accompanying text. 
124  Id. § 1.07. 
125  Id. § 1.07 n.2 and accompanying text. 
126  Id. § 1.07. 
127  Id. § 1.07 n.31 and accompanying text. 
128  Id. § 1.07 n.32 and accompanying text. 
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programs that had previously been run by the BIA.129 The Self-Determination 
Act “allowed tribes to contract to run health, education, economic develop-
ment, and varied social programs themselves,”130 and essentially encouraged 
Indian participation in federal programs historically run by the BIA.131 
The Tribal Self-Governance Act arose in response to a trial project that 
gave tribes block grants and allowed them budgeting authority.132 The Self-
Governance Act allows eligible tribes to engage in self-governance compacts, 
giving tribes more independence and the opportunity to self-govern.133 Both 
Acts give tribes the chance for tribal governments to provide services that were 
previously provided by the federal government.134 These two pieces of legisla-
tion set the stage for subsequent federal legislation involving Indian affairs that 
reflects a theme of “the protection and extension of tribal culture and life 
. . . .”135 
Another more recent legislative enactment is the Indian Gaming Regulato-
ry Act (IGRA) of 1988, which allows tribes to engage in gaming operations 
apart from state regulation.136 The federal statutes regulate gaming policy and 
types of gaming.137 IGRA also provides the federal framework for states and 
tribes to enter into gaming compacts.138 
Other notable legislation supporting tribal culture includes “the Indian 
Child Welfare Act, the Archaeological Resources Protection Act, the National 
Museum of the American Indian Act, the Native American Graves Protection 
and Repatriation Act, the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, the Tribally 
Controlled Schools Act, and the Indian Arts and Crafts Act.”139 
 
129  Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 
2203 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 450); COHEN’S, supra note 5, § 1.07 n.31 
and accompanying text. 
130  COHEN’S, supra note 5, § 1.07. 
131  Id. 
132  Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 
4250 (1994) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 450); Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen D. Osborne, 
The History, Status, and Future of Tribal Self-Governance Under the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 26–27 (2015). 
133  COHEN’S, supra note 5, § 1.07. 
134  Id. 
135  Id. Such subsequent federal legislation includes “the Indian Child Welfare Act, the Ar-
chaeological Resources Protection Act, the National Museum of the American Indian Act, 
the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, the American Indian Religious 
Freedom Act, the Tribally Controlled Schools Act, and the Indian Arts and Crafts Act.” Id. 
§ 1.07 nn.38–44 and accompanying text. 
136  Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 2701); COHEN’S, supra note 5, § 1.07 n.36 and accompanying text. 
137  COHEN’S, supra note 5, § 1.07 n.36 and accompanying text. 
138  Id. 
139  Id. § 1.07 nn.38–44 and accompanying text. 
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There was also the enactment of the federal Indian Civil Rights Act of 
1968 (ICRA).140 ICRA “limits the power of tribal governments by applying” a 
portion of the federal Bill of Rights—Due Process and Equal Protection—to 
Indian tribes.141 ICRA, however, did not incorporate the portion of the Bill of 
Rights containing the Establishment Clause, preserving the independence of 
tribes to function as religious and cultural sovereigns.142 
In light of the history of federal policies directed at replacing traditional 
tribal religious beliefs and practices with Christian rituals for much of the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries, religious freedom for tribes has been described 
as being “deeply connected to any policy of self-determination and cultural 
survival.”143 Federal legislation enacted in the late 1970s affirmed the federal 
government’s current policy “to protect and preserve” inherent religious free-
doms of American Indians.144 
Overall, the era of self-governance and self-determination focused on 
“economic development of Indian land, better utilization of . . . human re-
sources, and protection of [the] tribal [and] reservation environment.”145 The 
impact of the self-determination may be measured by the relative successes 
tribal programs and practices have with respect to delivery of health care, pro-
motion of tribal languages, and development of tribal justice systems. As com-
mentators note, in the 500 plus years of Indian policy reflecting vacillations in 
attitudes, since the 1960s the policy for self-determination has been “relatively 
stable,” with “strong emphasis on Native American decision making, economic 
development and cultural preservation and extension.”146 
B. Federal Taxation in Indian Country 
The U.S. Constitution explicitly states, “Indians [are] not taxed.”147 In the 
earlier part of the history of the United States, there was no federal income tax 
 
140  Id. § 1.07 n.21 and accompanying text. 
141  Id. § 1.07. ICRA was/remains controversial legislation. Id. § 1.07 n.21 and accompany-
ing text. As Cohen’s notes: “A major task of the self-governance era has been to create new 
structures for decision making and program administration at the tribal level.” Id. § 1.07. 
142  Id. § 1.07. 
143  Id. 
144  Id. § 1.07 n.62 and accompanying text (citing Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1996)) (protecting freedom to believe, express, and ex-
ercise). 
145  Id. § 1.07. 
146  Id. 
147  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. At the time the U.S. Constitution was adopted through the 
1870s, Congress entered treaties with Indian tribes in a formative period of American Indian 
law. COHEN’S, supra note 5, § 1.03[1]. The tribes had a weaker bargaining position in nego-
tiating the treaties, but the treaties themselves “had a moral and legal force that, while not 
always respected, was also not easily ignored.” Id.; 16th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: 
Federal Income Tax (1913), OURDOCUMENTS.GOV, https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc. 
php?flash=false&doc=57 (last visited Feb. 17, 2020). 
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imposed on anyone, Indian or otherwise.148 Despite the language of the Consti-
tution, current interpretation of federal tax law is that individual Indians are 
generally subject to federal income, estate, and gift taxes.149 Thus, individual 
“Indians must [generally] include in gross income their pro rata shares of tribal 
income” when distributed by the tribe.150 Indian tribes themselves are not sub-
ject to tax, including income generated by tribes via federally chartered Indian 
tribal corporations.151 
Some types of income to individual Indians, such as payments under spe-
cific treaties,152 statutory rights, and income from restricted trust allotments are 
 
148  Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4, with U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. The 16th Amend-
ment was ratified in 1913, and that same year marked the imposition of the first federal in-
come tax. 
149  Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6 (1956); Choteau v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 691, 696 (1931). 
150  BORRIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND 
GIFTS ¶ 1.2.9 (3d ed. 1999). 
151  Id. Indian tribal corporations organized under state laws are subject to federal tax. Id. 
152  The federal government entered treaties with tribes, generally, through the Removal and 
Reservation Era. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. The federal government’s trea-
ties with tribes varied, but common elements included a “guarantee of peace, a delineation of 
[land] boundaries . . . guarantee[s] of Indian hunting and fishing rights . . . and an agreement 
regarding the regulation of trade and travel of persons in the Indian territory.” WILLIAM C. 
CANBY JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 115–16 (5th ed. 2009). 
In some ways, these treaties are no different than treaties between the federal government 
and foreign nations. See id. at 118 (“A treaty between the United States and an Indian tribe is 
a contract between two sovereigns . . . .”). The federal government frequently enters into tax 
treaties with foreign countries regarding the U.S. tax consequences of foreign nationals. See 
RICHARD E. ANDERSEN, ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES ¶ 1.01 (2010) 
(noting purposes of income tax treaties: promotion of international trade and investment, 
avoidance of double taxation, reduction of taxation at source, avoidance of discrimination, 
competent authority for dispute resolution, information exchange, and other administrative 
assistance). The treaties the federal government entered into with tribes highlight the dispari-
ty between congressional goals with respect to cross-border trade and the lack of similar 
goals, through the enactment of exemptions or the entering in treaties, with respect to tribes. 
Most curious, however, is a federal tax provision that exempts some foreign earned income 
of U.S. nationals who are residing abroad. See I.R.C. § 911 (2012). Section 911 allows a 
U.S. citizen who resides abroad for an uninterrupted period to exclude up to $103,900 (ad-
justed to inflation for 2018) from gross income for federal income tax purposes. Id. 
§ 911(b)(2)(D). The foreign-earned-income-tax exclusion had two primary purposes: allevi-
ate double taxation concerns for U.S. citizens residing abroad (who would be subject to for-
eign income taxes and U.S. income taxes on their foreign source income) and to “decrease 
barriers to foreign trade.” Webster Beary, Note, Section 911: The Foreign Earned Income 
Inclusion? Using Clark v. Commissioner to Demonstrate How Courts Have Improperly Nar-
rowed the Scope of Section 911, 62 TAX LAW. 897, 899 (2009). Section 911 however also 
had broader goals that include: “equity between United States expatriates and domestic tax-
payers . . . increased employment of Americans, leading to increased exports and goodwill 
. . . improved ability to compete . . . avoidance of double taxation and the crediting of unre-
ceived governmental services.” Id. at 908 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Curiously, there exists no similar provision to exempt income earned by a member Indian 
who resides within a tribal territorial jurisdiction and earns income from sources entirely 
within the tribe or apart from the U.S, other than historical treaties or statutes regarding tribal 
resources. 
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properly excludable from gross income.153 These specific exclusions are based 
on case law interpreting whether Congress intended a tax exemption under the 
language of the applicable treaty or statute154 or by the statutory exclusion it-
self.155 Absent the specific exclusionary rule discussed below, payments by a 
tribe to its members for whatever purpose, including for health, education, 
housing and medical care, would be includable in the individual’s gross income 
for federal tax purposes.156 
C. The Statutory TGWE, Interpretative Guidance, and the Evolution 
The history of federal Indian law and policy and the federal tax status of 
tribes and their individual members sets the stage for the TGWE. In an exercise 
of self-determination, tribes went to Congress to enact a statute to ensure con-
sistent and fair enforcement, and to protect tribes from the IRS, particularly in 
the area of ceremony and cultural practices.157 This subpart examines the statu-
tory language and IRS published guidance regarding the statute. It also exam-
ines the history of IRS rules on the TGWE and the non-tribal counterpart, a 
general welfare exclusion. 
1. The Statutory Tribal General Welfare Exclusion 
In 2014, President Obama signed the Tribal General Welfare Exclusion 
Act into law, codifying long-standing administrative rules that provided for an 
exclusion from gross income for certain payments made by tribes to their 
members.158 The statutory tribal general welfare exclusion provides an exclu-
sion from gross income by the recipient of “any Indian general welfare bene-
fit.”159 Indian general welfare benefit includes payments made to a member, 
spouse, or dependent of such member, of an Indian tribe pursuant to an “Indian 
tribal government program . . . .”160 Payment may be made in cash, property or 
 
153  Squire, 351 U.S. at 6; BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 150, at ¶ 1.2.9. Also, the TGWE is 
another exclusion. See infra Section I.C.1. 
154  Squire, 351 U.S. at 6–7. 
155  I.R.C. § 7873(a)(1) (exempting from tax income generated from treaty fishing rights). 
156  See infra Section I.C.1. 
157  This is particularly evident in the language of the Act because it provides for consultation 
with Tribal Advisory Committee, that the canons of construction for Indian law apply, and 
requires the IRS to stay enforcement pending appropriate training and education of the ITG 
revenue agents. I.R.C. § 139E (2018). 
158  Tribal General Welfare Exclusion Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-168, 128 Stat. 1883 
(2014) (codified as I.R.C. § 139E). 
159  I.R.C. § 139E(a) (2018). In addition to direct payments, paragraph (b) of Section 139E 
also includes payments made on behalf of or services provided to a qualifying individual. Id. 
§ 139E(b). 
160  Id. § 139E(b). The statute defines “Indian tribal government” to include “any agencies or 
instrumentalities of an Indian tribal government and any Alaska Native regional or village 
corporation, as defined in, or established pursuant to, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement 
Act.” Id. § 139E(c)(1). The statute provides that the establishment of an “Indian tribal gov-
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in kind, or on behalf of the recipient.161 For the payment to be excludable from 
gross income, the statute restricts the Indian tribal government program and re-
quires such program to be administered under specific guidelines and available 
to all members (or dependents and spouses), not just those who participate in 
tribal governance.162 Additional restrictions in the statute require that the bene-
fits of such a program are:  
(A) “available to any tribal member who meets [the] guidelines,” 
(B) for “promotion of general welfare,” 
(C) “not lavish or extravagant, and 
(D) [] not compensation for services.”163 
These four restrictions are designed to ensure the following: First, the re-
quirement that the benefits be “available to any tribal member who meets such 
guidelines,” is intended to ensure that the benefits are widely available to quali-
fied recipients.164 Second, that the benefits be for “promotion of general wel-
fare,” imposes a need-based requirement for the recipient.165 Both of these re-
strictions have important practical considerations for tribes wishing to comply 
with the requirements for the TGWE as to how to structure guidelines for bene-
fits and ensure that said benefits are for supporting general welfare, as opposed 
to being distributed on a per-person basis.166 Such considerations are beyond 
the scope of this article. 
The last two restrictions, that the benefits not be “lavish or extravagant,” 
and not represent “compensation for services,” are germane to this article.167 As 
a foundational principle and general proposition, any transfer in exchange for 
services is considered taxable income to the recipient, regardless of whether 
cash or property is transferred.168 The statutory language carving out compen-
sation for services from the types of payments or transfers that qualify for the 
TGWE is therefore redundant under existing tax law that requires any compen-
sation received for services to be included in gross income. The TGWE uses 
 
ernment program” to provide benefits excludable under the statute “shall not fail . . . solely 
by reason of the program being established by tribal custom or government practice.” Id. 
§ 139E(c)(4). This provision has important ramifications for an Indian tribal government 
program that is established under cultural traditions as opposed to existing via tribal legisla-
tive process. 
161  Id. § 139E(b). 
162  Id. § 139E(b)(1). 
163  Id. § 139E(b)(2). 
164  Id. § 139E(b)(2)(A). 
165  Id. § 139E(b)(2)(B). 
166  The requirement that the benefits be for “general welfare” has origins in administrative 
exclusion for non-tribal governmental welfare benefits, see infra Section I.C.3, and possibly 
also because of concern that tribes would use the TGWE as an opportunity to mask taxable 
per-capita distributions of gaming revenues as tax free distributions. See infra note 239 and 
accompanying text. 
167  I.R.C. § 139(b)(2)(C)–(D). 
168  Id. § 61(a)(1); 26 C.F.R. § 1.61–1(a) (2012) (income includes payment in kind); id. 
§ 1.61–2(a) (income includes compensation for services). 
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the redundant statement as an opportunity to carve out a special rule, and the 
TGWE then provides that receipt of “[a]ny items of cultural significance, reim-
bursement of costs, or cash honorarium for participation in cultural or ceremo-
nial activities for the transmission of tribal culture [will] not be treated as com-
pensation for services,” and thus otherwise qualifies for exclusion.169 
Recognizing that the lavish and extravagant limitation is ambiguous, the 
codified statutory language of the TGWE provides that the Secretary of the 
Treasury (presumably designated to the IRS), shall consult with a Tribal Advi-
sory Committee to “establish guidelines for what constitutes lavish or extrava-
gant benefits with respect to Indian tribal government programs.”170 The un-
codified language of the Tribal General Welfare Exclusion Act specifies the 
membership makeup and duties of the Tribal Advisory Committee.171 As of the 
writing of this article, no guidance has been issued by the Tribal Advisory 
Committee interpreting what lavish and extravagant means under the TGWE. 
2. Published IRS Guidance Interpreting the TGWE 
The TGWE essentially mirrors a pre-codified version of the exclusion.172 
Following the enactment of the statutory exclusion, the IRS issued published 
guidance in Notice 2015-34 that stated the codification of the TGWE does not 
supplant the IRS’s prior guidance for “general welfare exclusion for certain 
benefits provided under Indian tribal government programs.”173 Notice 2015-34 
references Revenue Procedure 2014-35 (the Revenue Procedure), which was 
published just prior to the enactment of the statutory TGWE.174 The Revenue 
Procedure provides safe harbors for Indian tribal governmental programs to sat-
isfy the requirement of being based on individual need for general welfare ex-
clusions.175 
The Revenue Procedure provides a bright-line safe harbor list of types of 
benefit programs a tribe might administer that are deemed to satisfy the re-
 
169  I.R.C. § 139E(c)(5). 
170  Id. § 139E(c)(3) (establishing guidelines for what constitutes lavish and extravagant in 
consultation with a Tribal Advisory Committee) The special rules also define the terms “In-
dian Tribal Government” and “dependent.” Id. § 139E(c)(1)–(2). 
171  Tribal General Welfare Exclusion Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-168, § 3, 128 Stat. 1883, 
1884 (2014). The duties of the Tribal Advisory Committee are to advise the IRS “on matters 
relating to the taxation of Indians” and provide advice to the IRS on the training and educa-
tion of IRS field agents working in Indian country. Id. § 3(b). The law requires there to be 
seven members of the Committee for staggered terms of four years, three of whom are to be 
appointed by the IRS and the remaining four to be appointed by congressional leaders. Id. 
§ 3(c). 
172  Pre-statutory versions of the administrative doctrine include Rev. Rul. 2005-46, 2005-2 
C.B. 120; I.R.S. Notice 2003-18, 2003-1 C.B. 699; Rev. Rul. 82-106, 1982-1 C.B. 16; Rev. 
Rul. 75-246, 1975-1 C.B. 24. 
173  I.R.S. Notice 2015-34, 2015-18 I.R.B. 942. 
174  Id. 
175  Rev. Proc. 2014-35, 2014-26 I.R.B. 1110, § 1. 
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quirement that the benefit addresses individual need.176 The list identifies spe-
cific programs to address housing, educational needs, elder and disabled assis-
tance, and other qualifying assistance.177 If a tribe makes a payment pursuant to 
a program articulated in the safe harbor, the requirement that the benefit be for 
general welfare is presumed.178 
The Revenue Procedure elaborates on the exclusion for benefits to pay ex-
penses or costs related to cultural and religious programs that satisfy the indi-
vidual need requirement.179 It specifically lists programs that pay expenses for 
an individual “to attend or participate in an Indian tribe’s cultural, social, reli-
gious, or community activities,”180 “to visit sites that are culturally or histori-
cally significant for the tribe,”181 and to receive “instruction about an Indian 
tribe’s culture, history, and traditions,”182 all of which fall within the safe har-
bor for individual need. Similarly, the Revenue Procedure specifies that pro-
grams that pay funeral and burial expenses, including hosting and attending 
wakes or other bereavement events, also fall within the safe harbor for cultural 
and religious programs.183 As a general catch all, the Revenue Procedure also 
provides that payments of transportation and admission costs to attend “educa-
tional, social, or cultural programs,” are within the safe harbor, whether offered 
by the individual’s tribe or another tribe.184 
 
176  Id. § 5.02(2). Revenue Procedure 2014-35 was issued in response to I.R.S. Notice 2012-
75, 2012-51 I.R.B. 715, and comments received in response to that notice. Revenue Proce-
dure 2014-35 contains twenty-nine enumerated changes in response to the comments on No-
tice 2012-75. The changes all represent expansions, additions or clarifications in the lan-
guage from the earlier Notice 2012-75. Id. § 2.06(1)–(29). None of the changes represent a 
departure from the general policies or purpose of the original notice. Id. 
177  Id. § 5.02(2)(a) (benefits for the acquisition, maintenance, improvement of housing); id. 
§ 5.02(2)(b) (benefits for educational expenses and attending costs); id. § 5.02(2)(c) (benefits 
for elder care); id. § 5.02(2)(d) (benefits for “[o]ther qualifying assistance programs.”). The 
“[o]ther qualifying assistance programs” all relate to programs that provide benefits to pay 
for transportation and personal living expenses for an individual to obtain services, such as 
medical care away from home, or for assistance with exigent circumstances and emergen-
cies. Id. § 5.02(2)(d). 
178  Id. § 5.01(1). This article is focused on the implications of the lavish and extravagant 
limitation as it relates to benefits for the promotion of tribal cultural and ceremonial practices 
only. There are practical considerations for tribes as to how to administer tribal general wel-
fare benefits for housing, medical, and educational expenses to ensure that such benefits are 
not lavish and extravagant. These considerations are outside the scope of this article. 
179  Id. § 5.02(2)(e)(i)–(v). 
180  Id. § 5.02(2)(e)(i). The Revenue Procedure provides examples of such activities as “pow-
wows, ceremonies, and traditional dances.” Id. 
181  Id. § 5.02(2)(e)(ii). The Revenue Procedure also states that such sites might include an-
other Indian reservation. Id. 
182  Id. § 5.02(2)(e)(iii). The education includes, but is not limited to, instruction on “tradi-
tional language, music, and dances . . . .” Id. 
183  Id. § 5.02(2)(e)(iv). The Revenue Procedure refers to funerals, burials, and “subsequent 
honoring events . . . .” Id. 
184  Id. § 5.02(2)(e)(v). 
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The Revenue Procedure states that benefits provided under an Indian tribal 
governmental program to religious or spiritual officers or leaders “to recognize 
their participation in cultural, religious, [or] social events” that are “items of 
cultural significance that are not lavish or extravagant,” or represent “nominal 
cash honoraria” will not be considered compensation for services for purposes 
of the general welfare exclusion.185 
3. The General Welfare Exclusion for Benefits Provided by Non-Tribal 
Governments 
In addition to the TGWE, which existed for decades as administrative rule 
prior to codification, there also exists a parallel doctrine, called the general wel-
fare exclusion, for welfare benefits paid by non-tribal governments.186 This ex-
clusion is usually referred to as the general welfare exclusion (GWE). 
The GWE is an administrative doctrine, created by the IRS.187 The GWE 
provides that certain payments made to any individual by governmental enti-
ties, at the state, local, and federal level, for the promotion of general welfare, 
could be excluded from gross income of the recipient.188 The GWE exclusion 
appears to date back to at least 1938 in a ruling by the IRS that Social Security 
Benefits were not includable in gross income.189 
In determining whether the GWE applies to such payments, the IRS gener-
ally requires that the payments: (1) be made from a governmental general wel-
fare fund; (2) be for the promotion of the general welfare, that is based on need 
as opposed to a distribution made to all residents without regard to financial 
status, health, educational background, or employment status; and (3) not be 
made with respect to services rendered by the recipient.190 
The GWE has generally been “limited to individuals who receive govern-
mental payments to help them with their individual needs,” such as housing or 
educational assistance, or assistance in obtaining basic necessities.191 There are 
payments that a state or local government makes that do not give rise to gross 
income in the first instance because the payments only indirectly benefit the re-
 
185  Id. § 5.03. 
186  See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 98-19, 1998-1 C.B. 840 (excluding from gross income relocation 
costs paid by a local jurisdiction to flood victims); Rev. Rul. 74-205, 1974-1 C.B. 21 (ex-
cluding from gross income payments from government to aid persons displaced from their 
homes in seeking housing). 
187  See Rev. Rul. 74-205, 1974-1 C.B. 21. 
188  I.R.S. Notice 99-3, 1999-1 C.B. 271 (excluding benefits paid under Temporary Assis-
tance for Needy Families). 
189  Congress specifically overturned the doctrine with respect to unemployment and Social 
Security benefits. I.T. 3229, 1938-2 C.B. 136 (1938); I.T. 3194, 1938-1 C.B. 114 (1938). 
Section 85 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that unemployment benefits are fully in-
cludable in gross income. I.R.C. § 85(b)–(c) (2018). Section 86 provides that half of Social 
Security is includable. Id. § 86 (a)(1)(A). 
190  Maines v. Comm’r, 144 T.C. 123, 138 (2015). 
191  I.R.S. Notice 2003-18, 2003-1 C.B. 699. 
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cipients, such as public libraries, community recreational facilities, or other 
community facilities for the general public.192 Payments to businesses generally 
do not qualify because they are not based on individual or family needs,193 and 
payments in lieu of compensation do not qualify under the GWE.194 
While the legal foundation for the general welfare exclusion is not entirely 
clear, the most likely reason for the exclusion is that “Congress simply did not 
intend to tax this kind of receipt.”195 From a policy perspective, the GWE 
aligns with the structure of the federal income tax system, which is a progres-
sive tax system. A progressive income tax system means that a taxpayer’s tax 
burden increases as the taxpayer’s income rises.196 A progressive tax system 
advances the goal of achieving vertical equity, or the concern that the appropri-
ate tax burden should be borne by taxpayers according to their ability to pay.197 
The policies served by the GWE align with the progressive tax system because 
taxpayers who qualify for general welfare-type benefits generally lack the abil-
ity to pay. A taxpayer who qualifies for and receives some types of general 
welfare benefit does not offend notions of vertical equity, and the result is 
“fair.”198 There are other justifications for the exclusion, including the adminis-
trative concerns where the general welfare benefit is not a cash payment.199 
Under those circumstances, the recipient may lack sufficient liquidity to pay 
any tax imposed.200 
 
192  These types of general public benefits do not give rise to gross income, and the TGWE 
likewise does not apply to such types of benefits. Rev. Proc. 2014-35, 2014-21 I.R.B. 1110, 
§ 2.04. 
193  Id. § 2.02. 
194  Id. § 2.03. 
195  THEODORE P. SETO, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS 53–
54 (2d ed. 2015). Professor Seto also notes that there is no legislative history to support this 
position, but that “it does seem unlikely that Congress intended to subject governmental ben-
efits and services to income taxation.” Id. at 54. Professor Seto looks at other similar exclu-
sions, such as Sections 102 and 118 to draw support for the general welfare exclusion by 
analogy. Id. Section 102 excludes gifts from gross income, I.R.C. § 102(a) (2018), and Sec-
tion 118 excludes governmental and other subsidies from corporate income. Id. § 118(a). 
Regardless of the legal reasons for the exclusion, the general welfare exclusion is hardly a 
common or hot topic in tax. As Professor Seto states, “the doctrine continues to function in 
obscurity . . . .” SETO, supra, at 55. 
196  JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE 
OVER TAXES 88 (5th ed. 2017). 
197  Id. at 88–89. 
198  To be clear, the federal tax system is not only concerned with vertical equity. Id. at 437 
n.92. There are other fairness issues involved, and other competing policies such as simplici-
ty and ease of administration. See id. at chapter 5 (“Simplicity and Enforceability”). 
199  A taxpayer who is in receipt of any general welfare benefits, in particular those who re-
ceive benefits in kind, such as payments made on their behalf for housing, education, or 
medical care, will most likely lack the cash necessary to pay the tax on the benefit. Enforce-
ment of a tax imposed on such benefits would be very difficult. 
200  Generally, all realized gains must be recognized, see I.R.C. § 1001(c) (2018), and the 
lack of liquidity from a transaction does not prevent the tax consequences. Cf. Eisner v. Ma-
comber, 252 U.S. 189, 193–94 (1920). The tax code does permit deferral of tax consequenc-
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D. Comparison of the Canons of Construction in Tax Law Versus Federal 
Indian Law and Application of Federal Indian Law Canons Under the 
TGWE 
Because this article seeks to interpret the language of a new federal statute, 
a tax practitioner or scholar may think it a simple matter of “employ[ing] the 
usual tools of statutory construction.”201 The rules for statutory construction of 
federal tax law are generally no different than those for other types of stat-
utes.202 If a term is defined by the code, that definition controls.203 If a term is 
undefined, it is usually a matter of interpreting the language according to its 
plain meaning.204 If the language of the statute is ambiguous or would lead to 
absurdity, courts may look to external sources, such as legislative history and 
policy.205 Provisions of the code are read together with other provisions to de-
vise cohesive and coherent principles. 
Indian law issues are not analyzed in the same manner as federal tax stat-
utes.206 The canons of construction in federal Indian law, sometimes referred to 
as sympathetic construction, are different in that they provide that ambiguities 
in the statute are to be resolved in favor of the tribes and that deference shall be 
given to the tribes.207 The canons arose out of the need to compensate tribes for 
the unequal bargaining power they had at the time tribes entered into treaties 
with the federal government and to help effectuate the federal trust responsibil-
ity.208 In construing treaties, it means interpreting them as they would have 
been “understood by the tribal representatives” at the time of negotiation.209 
 
es in certain circumstances where public policy so warrants. See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1) (allow-
ing for deferral on exchanges of like kind property); id. § 1033(a)(1) (allowing for deferral of 
recognition on reinvestment of proceeds from involuntary conversions); id. § 1041(a)(1)–(2) 
(requiring non-recognition on transfers between spouses or incident to divorce); id. § 721(a) 
(deferring recognition on transfers of property in exchange for partnership interests). 
201  BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 150, at ¶ 4.2. n.7 and accompanying text. 
202  Id. 
203  Id. 
204  Id. ¶ 4.2. nn.16, 16.3 and accompanying text. 
205  Id. ¶ 4.2. 
206  To the contrary, one scholar stated that “[t]he distinguishing feature of Indian tax law . . . 
is the absence of statutes.” Russel Lawrence Barsh, Issues in Federal, State, and Tribal Tax-
ation of Reservation Wealth: A Survey and Economic Critique, 54 WASH. L. REV. 531, 544 
(1979) (noting that Indians are not defined under the tax code). 
207  COHEN’S, supra note 5, at § 2.02[3]; LUNA-FIREBAUGH, TRIBAL POLICING: ASSERTING 
SOVEREIGNTY, SEEKING JUSTICE 10 (2007). 
208  CANBY JR., supra note 152, at 116 (listing disadvantages to tribes in treaty process such 
as federal government dictated terms; treaties were written in English; concepts may have 
been foreign to tribes; and the government may have negotiated with parties other than tribal 
leaders). 
209  Id. at 122. 
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The canons of construction have been extended to statutes dealing with Indian 
affairs.210 
In general, whether the canons of construction for Indian law apply in the 
federal tax context is somewhat uncertain.211 However, the uncodified statutory 
language of the TGWE is clear that the canons of construction of Indian law 
apply in construing the TGWE and that deference be given to the tribes with 
respect to their general welfare programs.212 
II. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF THE LAVISH AND 
EXTRAVAGANT LIMITATION ON TRIBALLY SOURCED TRANSFERS TO 
INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATE IN CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS CEREMONIAL 
ACTIVITIES 
Because the words “lavish” and “extravagant” are not defined in the 
TGWE, the IRS and consulted groups have been tasked with promulgating in-
terpretive guidance as to the meaning. As of the writing of this article, no guid-
ance has been issued by the IRS. To help the IRS understand the issue, this 
analysis examines the meaning of lavish and extravagant in other instances 
within the tax law itself. Finding the analogies to other areas of the tax law in-
appropriate and after applying the canons of construction for federal Indian 
law—as required by the statute—the analysis turns to the question of the pur-
pose and value of the lavish and extravagant limitation and discusses how such 
a limitation is inconsistent with current federal Indian policy. 
 
210  Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985) (“[S]tatutes are to be 
construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their 
benefit.”) (internal citations omitted); Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Indian Reserva-
tion v. Washington, 96 F.3d 334, 340 (9th Cir. 1996). This principle has been true even when 
courts have faced two possible constructions. See Cty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & 
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992). 
211  See ABIGAIL BOUDEWYNS ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK § 11:11 (2019) 
(“Notwithstanding the clarification provided in Chickasaw, there remains uncertainty over 
the proper interaction between the Indian canons of construction and determinations of 
whether tribes or Indians are entitled to an exemption from a generally applicable federal 
tax.”). 
212  Tribal General Welfare Exclusion Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-168, 128 Stat. 1883, 
1884 (2014) (uncodified language) (“Ambiguities in section 139E . . . shall be resolved in 
favor of Indian tribal governments and deference shall be given to Indian tribal governments 
for the programs administered and authorized by the tribe to benefit the general welfare of 
the tribal community.”). 
Although the TGWE specifically says the canons of construction for Indian law apply, it is 
arguably an unnecessary statement. The TGWE implicates federal Indian law and policy, 
and most likely the canons of Indian law would apply regardless of express statement. 
Furthermore, as discussed supra at note 157 and accompanying text, the statute provides that 
the guidelines interpreting lavish and extravagant shall be made in consultation with a Tribal 
Advisory Committee. 
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A. The Meaning of Lavish and Extravagant in Other Parts of the Tax Laws 
To interpret the meaning of lavish and extravagant for purposes of the 
TGWE, the analysis first demands that the canons of construction for Indian 
law apply.213 That is to say, all ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the 
tribe. With that statutory construction principle in mind, there are two other in-
stances in the tax laws where the same language is used. The first is in the tax 
code itself that prohibits business deductions for lavish and extravagant travel 
expenses.214 The second is in the IRS guidance providing for the GWE for ben-
efits paid by non-tribal governments.215 
1. The Express Prohibition on the Deduction for Lavish and Extravagant 
Travel Expenses Incurred in the Course of a Trade or Business 
Besides the TGWE, the tax code expressly uses the phrase “lavish and ex-
travagant,” only as a limitation to the deductibility of travel expenses and busi-
ness meals while away from home.216 Generally, a taxpayer may deduct the 
“ordinary and necessary” expenses of carrying on a trade or business, including 
travel expenses.217 Deductible travel expenses include expenses “for meals and 
lodging[,]” but the code disallows the deduction for “amounts which are lavish 
or extravagant.”218 The code does not define what constitutes lavish or extrava-
gant travel and meal expenses, but the IRS has construed the phrase to be a sub-
jective limitation depending on what would be lavish in the context of the tax-
payer’s particular business.219 
In published guidance, the IRS has articulated that, “[a]n expense is not 
considered lavish or extravagant if it is reasonable considering the facts and 
circumstances. Expenses will not be disallowed just because they are more than 
a fixed dollar amount or take place at deluxe restaurants, hotels, nightclubs, or 
resorts.”220 Because travel and meal expenses are inherently connected to the 
personal needs of human beings, the prohibition on the deduction of “lavish 
and extravagant” expenditures is obviously intended to curb abuse.221 
 
213  See supra notes 200–2011 and accompanying text. 
214  I.R.C. 162(a)(2) (2018); see also infra Section II.A.1. 
215  See infra Section II.A.2. 
216  I.R.C. § 162(a)(2); id. § 274(k)(1)(A). 
217  Id. § 162(a). 
218  Id. § 162(a)(2) (travel expenses); id. § 274(k)(1)(A) (business meals). 
219  I.R.S. Publication 463, No. 11081L, 12 (Feb. 6, 2015) (“[a]n expense is not considered 
lavish or extravagant if it is reasonable considering the facts and circumstances.”); see also 
Rev. Rul. 63-144, 1963-2 C.B. 129 (1963). 
220  I.R.S. Publication 463, supra note 219, at 12. 
221  The tax code disallows deductions for “personal, living, or family” expenditures. I.R.C. 
§ 262(a). Treasury regulations provide examples of non-deductible personal expenses, such 
as costs of housing, “domestic service,” and commuting. Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(2) (2014) 
(costs of owning a home), (3) (costs of maintaining a home), and (5) (commuting costs). 
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The standard for what constitutes lavish and extravagant travel expenses is 
thus, similar to what is “ordinary and necessary” for a business, subjective in 
nature, depending on what is reasonable for that particular business.222 The IRS 
depends on a natural tension between corporations, which in theory answer to 
boards of directors and shareholders, and employees who engage in business 
travel, and who may desire more lavish or extravagant accommodations, to 
serve as a check on the reasonableness of travel expenditures.223 The IRS may 
afford less deference to smaller businesses, especially when the traveler is also 
the decision maker for the business, such as in sole proprietorships.224 In any 
business, big or small, there is a presumed profit motive and any extra or un-
necessary spending will reduce potential profits.225 
The utility of the analogy of the subjective interpretation of lavish and ex-
travagant travel expenses in the context of the TGWE is mixed and depends on 
the particular tribe. On the one hand, the inherent check on business expenses 
by shareholders and boards of directors would seem to be absent from distribu-
tions from tribes to their members. In other areas, transfers between tribes and 
members have historically been viewed as suspect by the federal govern-
ment.226 However, depending on the structure of a tribe’s leadership, a similar 
 
The rules are both intended to prevent deduction of extravagant expenditures that have in-
herently personal nature, such as cruise ships and foreign conventions, I.R.C. § 274(h), and 
to limit deductions, such as limiting deductions to the face value of entertainment tickets, id. 
§ 274 (a)(l); luxury water transportation, id. § 274(m); 50 percent of meals and entertain-
ment, id. § 274(n); and a limit on the depreciation on luxury cars. Id. § 280F. 
222  Although there are no cases interpreting the “lavish and extravagant” limitation; to be 
deductible, Section 162 also requires the expense to be “ordinary and necessary.” I.R.C. 
§ 162(a). Implicit in the statutory construction of the word “necessary” is a reasonable stand-
ard. See, e.g., United States v. Haskel Eng’g & Supply Co., 380 F.2d 786, 788–89 (9th Cir. 
1967) (holding an unreasonable amount of an expenditure non-deductible despite the ordi-
nary and necessary nature of the expense); Comm’r v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 176 F.2d 815, 817 
(6th Cir. 1949) (“[T]he element of reasonableness is inherent in the phrase ‘ordinary and 
necessary.’ ”). 
By comparison, other tests for whether an expenditure is deductible as a business expense 
depend on objective standards. See, e.g., Pevsner v. Comm’r, 628 F.2d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 
1980) (setting forth objective test for deductibility of clothing). 
223  See, e.g., Palo Alto Town & Country Vill., Inc. v. Comm’r, 565 F.2d 1388, 1390–91 (9th 
Cir. 1977) (reversing Tax Court’s determination that expenditures to maintain private jet 
were not deductible because there was evidence the expenses were “appropriate and help-
ful,” and “normal[]” given the taxpayer’s circumstances). 
224  See, e.g., Velez v. Comm’r, 115 T.C.M. (CCH) 1201 (2018); Linzy v. Comm’r, 219 
T.C.M. (RIA) 11–12 (2013); Bogue v. Comm’r, 164 T.C.M. (RIA) 10 (2011); In re Stange-
land v. Comm’r, 185 T.C.M. (RIA) 35–36 (2010). 
225  This may be a naïve understanding as to how business decision makers rationalize spend-
ing on deductible expenses. As noted, at supra notes 223–25 and accompanying text, the 
smaller the business and more intimately the owner is connected to the traveling representa-
tive, there may exist great potential for abuse in “mixing business with pleasure,” and mak-
ing decisions with respect to travel that are more luxurious or extravagant than if the expens-
es were not deductible. 
226  See infra Section II.B.2 (discussing legislative history under IGRA for tribes operating 
casinos and expressing concerns for organized crime). 
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tension may exist if there is a democratic check on the decisions made by tribal 
leaders. 
2. The Implied Prohibition on Lavish and Extravagant Benefits in the 
Context of Non-Tribal GWE 
The non-tribal government GWE doctrine generally prohibits exclusion 
from gross income of lavish and extravagant benefits and restricts exclusion to 
those minimal amounts needed to support basic needs.227 The non-tribal gov-
ernment GWE is not codified in statute, so the limitation has been implied 
through interpretive guidance. The rulings that set forth exclusions for general 
welfare imply the limitation. For example, the guidance specifies that payments 
for housing for displaced people are only available to help acquire modest 
housing.228 To be excludable from gross income, government assistance for 
disaster victims must only be used on necessary medical or housing expenses, 
to replace personal property, or to cover transportation or funeral expenses, and 
cannot be for non-essential, luxurious, or decorative items.229 Similar guidance 
requires that excludable payments to compensate victims of emergency or dis-
aster situations may only be to cover “unreimbursed [] reasonable and neces-
sary personal, living, and family expenses.”230 In the context of the welfare 
benefit exclusion, the language is intended to curb perceived abuse and mistrust 
of the welfare system.231 
While it may seem helpful to analogize welfare benefit payments made by 
governmental entities such as state and local governments, it is far from a per-
fect analogy. The relationship between the federal government and state and 
local governments is fundamentally different from the relationship between 
tribes and the federal government.232 The federal Constitution is replete with 
examples of how the federal government has broad governing powers over the 
 
227  See supra Section I.C.3 n.189 and accompanying text. 
228  Rev. Rul. 74-205, 1974-1 C.B. 21 (qualifying replacement housing must be modest 
standard). 
229  Rev. Rul. 76-144, 1976-1 C.B. 17 (finding assistance for nonessential, luxurious, or dec-
orative items do not qualify). 
230  I.R.S. Notice 2002-76, 2002-2 C.B. 917 (holding payments for “unreimbursed . . . rea-
sonable and necessary personal, living, and family expenses” incurred in disaster or emer-
gency qualify for exclusion). 
231  The non-tribal governmental general welfare exclusions from gross income also prohibit 
exclusion if the benefits are lavish and extravagant. See Rev. Rul. 74-205, 1974-1 C.B. 21 
(holding replacement housing payments for displaced families excludable if replacement 
housing is of modest standard); Rev. Rul. 76-144, 1976-1 C.B. 17 (disallowing exclusion of 
benefits for nonessential, luxurious, or decorative items under disaster victim assistance 
payments). 
232  The federal government’s relationship with tribes is, as described in the field of Indian 
law, multi-faceted and complex. 
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states under the principles of federalism.233 The federal government’s govern-
ing authority over tribes is more complicated because the relationships between 
the federal government and tribal nations originated with treaties between the 
two, signifying a more lateral, equal relationship.234 The federal government 
also is bound by the trust relationship—early Supreme Court jurisprudence 
characterized tribes as “domestic dependent nations.”235 It is settled law that a 
tribe has general governmental power over its territory unless a federal statute 
or treaty somehow limits the tribe’s power.236 It is therefore appropriate for the 
federal tax system to place limits on the excludability from gross income of 
certain payments between state and local governments and individuals where it 
is not appropriate in the context of payments made by tribes.237 
Comparing the exclusionary tax doctrines themselves, the scope of the ex-
clusion for Indian tribal government welfare benefits (TGWE) is much broader 
than for welfare benefits provided by non-tribal governments (GWE) because 
of the special provision relating to transfers made to support cultural and cere-
monial practices.238 That the TGWE offers support for religious and spiritual 
practices, in addition to housing, education, medical, and other basic welfare 
services, is a major distinction. 
The usefulness of analogies from other areas of tax law that use the same 
lavish and extravagant language or similar concepts in the context of the 
TGWE varies. Because of the enormous distinctions between the relationships 
 
233  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. X (powers not delegated to the federal government are 
reserved for the states); id. art. VI, cl. 2 (supremacy clause). Compare id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1–18 
(enumerated powers of congress), with id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3(Indian commerce clause). 
234  See supra at Section I.A.1, for background on the history of treaties between the federal 
government and tribes. This is different than the states who agreed to the federalist principles 
by ratifying the U.S. Constitution. Obviously, any notions of equal sovereignty were eroded 
when the federal government ceased making treaties with Indian Tribes toward the end of 
the time of removal and creation of reservations, and instead began exercising legislative 
authority over Indian affairs. See COHEN’S, supra note 5, at § 1.03[9]. However, the origin of 
their relationship recognized mutual sovereignty in government-to-government dealings. Id. 
235  Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16–17 (1831). The concept of the trust 
relationship between the U.S. and tribes was further described as a “ward to his guardian.” 
Id. at 17. Narrowly defined, the trust relationship “approximates that of [a] trustee and bene-
ficiary,” though with various levels of legal enforceability. CANBY JR., supra note 152, at 35. 
236  Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563 (1981). 
237  An argument against this is that the Federal government provides funds to both states and 
tribes to administer—e.g., Federal government gives funds to states and states administer 
them, such as Medicare/Medicaid, education, and roads. The BIA gives funds to tribes to 
manage too. See, e.g., Press Release, Bureau Indian Affairs, Assistant Secretary Tara 
Sweeney Announces 2019 NABDI Grants Totaling $727,229 Awarded to 21 American Indi-
an and Alaska Native Tribes (Feb. 5, 2020) (available at https://www.bia.gov/as-ia/opa/onl 
ine-press-release/assistant-secretary-tara-sweeney-announces-2019-nabdi-grants-totaling [h 
ttps://perma.cc/7S8G-4R4Z]); Bureau of Indian Affairs Federal Grants, FED. GRANTS WIRE,  
https://www.federalgrantswire.com/bureau-of-indian-affairs-department-of-the-interior- 
federal-grants.html#.XlSdUShKg2w [https://perma.cc/6AGL-CSTF] (last visited Feb. 24,  
2020). 
238  I.R.C. § 139E(b), (c)(5) (2018). 
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between tribes and the federal government versus the relationship between the 
federal government and state and local governments, the analogy to the mean-
ing of lavish and extravagant in the GWE is not helpful. The subjective stand-
ard for the meaning of lavish and extravagant in the context of business travel 
deductions is more useful but still limited. The main limitation is that in analo-
gizing other areas of tax law, the analysis utilizes the canons of construction for 
tax law, as opposed to the canons of construction for federal Indian law as re-
quired by the Tribal General Exclusion Act. 
B. Potential Purposes of the Prohibition on Lavish and Extravagant Benefits 
To properly interpret the meaning of the prohibition of lavish and extrava-
gant distributions, it is important to examine what evils Congress was seeking 
to combat. Though the legislative history is relatively scant on this point, there 
are two possible concerns that Congress and/or possibly the Department of 
Treasury were seeking to address. 
1. Concern About Tribes Masking Taxable Distributions of Gaming 
Proceeds as Tax-Free General Welfare Payments 
Congress and the IRS seem particularly worried about potential abuse of a 
tribe distributing so called “per capita payments,” derived from gaming reve-
nues to tribal members.239 The IGRA permits a tribe to engage in gaming and 
distribute the revenue equally among its members in “per capita” payments.240 
Per capita distributions of gaming revenues, which are subject to IGRA, consti-
tute gross income and are not excludable under the GWE.241 A tribe that makes 
per capita distributions of gaming revenues is subject to federal tax reporting 
and withholding requirements, and the tribe must notify tribe members of their 
tax liability.242 The federal government is concerned that tribes will get more 
aggressive and plan to disguise gaming revenue per capita payments as general 
welfare benefits,243 despite the fact that the TGWE does not speak to the source 
of funds and that one of the proscribed uses for net gaming revenues is to fund 
general welfare programs for the tribe.244 It seems as though it would be per-
 
239  During a legislative hearing leading up to the passage of Section 139E, Senator Tom 
Udall of New Mexico expressed his concerns: “I am especially concerned that Tribal pro-
grams to improve housing conditions, provide training and educational opportunities, and to 
preserve traditional customs could be viewed as a way to skirt taxation of per capita pay-
ments.” Hearings, supra note 18, at 3 (statement of Hon. Tom Udall, U.S. Sen. N.M.). 
240  25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1), (b)(3) (2018). 
241  Id. § 2710(b)(3); 25 C.F.R. § 290.1–2, 6–8, 10, 12, 20 (2019). 
242  25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(3)(D); I.R.C. § 3402(r)(1) (2018). 
243  See 25 C.F.R. § 290.1. For further discussion on per capita distributions of gaming reve-
nues and the litigation such payments have engendered, see KATHRYN R.L. RAND & STEVEN 
ANDREW LIGHT, INDIAN GAMING LAW AND POLICY 66–68 (2d Ed. 2014). 
244  25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B). The five purposes for which a tribe may use net gaming rev-
enues are to fund tribal government or operations, provide for general welfare of the tribe, 
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fectly legal, and tribes could comply with the requirements of the TGWE, to 
fund welfare distributions from gaming revenues. 
Attempting to disguise distribution of gaming proceeds that are taxable on 
a per capita basis as welfare benefits may appear abusive to the federal gov-
ernment. As long as a tribe complies with the IRS published guidance on the 
matter, a tribe may in fact structure redistribution of gaming proceeds as gen-
eral welfare benefits and legally avoid taxation (i.e. making the payment not 
subject to inclusion in gross income by recipient and not reportable as a pay-
ment by tribe). 
A recent case out of the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of a tribe’s at-
tempt to recharacterize per capita distributions as general welfare benefits that 
would be excludable by the tribal member recipient.245 In United States v. Jim, 
Sally Jim, an enrolled member of the Miccosukee Indian Tribe, a federally rec-
ognized Indian tribe in Florida, sought to refute federal tax assessments on a 
distribution of $272,000 she received from her tribe.246 The tribal member ar-
gued that distributions received from the tribe were exempt from tax because 
they constituted Indian general welfare benefits under Section 139E.247 The 
source of the vast majority of the amount the Miccosukee Tribe distributed was 
from gaming revenues.248 The district court granted summary judgment in fa-
vor of the IRS on the issue that per capita distributions made pursuant to IGRA 
are subject to federal taxation, but a trial was held on the issue as to how much 
of the distribution came from tribal gaming sources.249 At trial, Sally Jim did 
not present evidence that any portion of the distribution she received from the 
tribe came from sources other than tribal gaming revenue, and the district court 
found that her entire distribution was from gaming revenue.250 On appeal, the 
Eleventh Circuit considered whether the TGWE amends the mandate in IGRA 
that per capita distributions are taxable.251 Holding that the TGWE does not re-
lease per capita distributions from taxation, the court emphasized that the lan-
guage of IGRA was clear on the tax consequences of per capita payments and 
 
“promote tribal economic development,” support charitable organizations, and to fund opera-
tions of local governmental agencies. Id. 
245  United States v. Jim, 891 F.3d 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 2018). Related to the case United 
States v. Jim, was a case in which a tribe asserted that distributions were made pursuant to 
the TGWE, and thus the IRS could not summons information regarding the distributions, 
which the court found were per capita distributions of gaming revenues. See United States v. 
Billie, 611 F. App’x. 608, 611–12 (11th Cir. 2015). 
246  Jim, 891 F.3d at 1246–47. The distributions were made to Sally Jim individually, but the 
total amount was $68,000 per person, and she received a total amount for her, her husband, 
and her two children. Id. at 1246. 
247  Id. at 1247. 
248  Id. at 1246. Of the total $32,268,000 distributed in 2001 by the Miccosukee Indian Tribe, 
only $164, 319 came from non-gaming sources. Id. 
249  Id. at 1247–48. 
250  Id. at 1248. 
251  Id. at 1250. 
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nothing in the language of the TGWE nor its legislative history indicated an in-
tent to change the tax consequences imposed by IGRA.252 
2. Veiled Racism and Classism 
A possible reason Congress included the restriction of lavish and extrava-
gant benefits could stem from longstanding distrust of the ability of tribes to 
govern.253 Paternalistic at best, and thinly veiled racist and classist at worst, the 
prevailing attitudes among federal lawmakers is distrust in Indian tribes.254 
These beliefs lead to Congress imposing limitations on the tax exclusion to 
prevent tribes from engaging in abusive behavior by distributing excessive ben-
efits to those members who participate in cultural and ceremonial activities. 
While the concern for abuse of camouflaging taxable per-capita distribu-
tions of gaming proceeds through a tax-free general welfare benefit was ex-
pressly stated by at least one Congressional leader,255 there is no direct evi-
dence that Congress harbors racist and classist views of tribal administration of 
tribal welfare programs. Such evidence is circumstantial and derived from both 
positions the federal government has taken with respect to other legislation and 
in litigation against tribes and history itself.256 
As an example of the federal government’s distrust of tribes, in litigation 
against a federally recognized Indian tribe, the United States argued that a state 
ought to be able to regulate the transportation of cigarettes by tribal members 
and tribal businesses despite treaty language granting the tribe the right to trav-
el.257 The government’s argument, in part, was based on concerns for a “slip-
pery slope” where the lack of a state’s ability to regulate could lead to the 
tribe’s transportation within the state of “other ‘restricted goods,’ such as illegal 
narcotics.”258 Disagreeing with the potential parade of evils highlighted by the 
federal government, the Ninth Circuit quoted the Yakama Nation’s amicus cu-
riae brief, which defended the conduct of the tribe, saying: 
The Yakama Nation is a sovereign nation, with its own government, laws and 
courts, not a rogue organization or menace to civil order. The Yakama Nation 
does not and never has asserted that its members have a right under its treaty to 
 
252  Id. at 1251. 
253  The establishment of the trust relationship itself established the paternalistic nature of 
federal-tribal relations. 
254  For example, under IGRA, a tribe may only use net gaming revenues for one of five pur-
poses. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B) (2018). 
255  See Hearings, supra note 18, at 5 (statement of Hon. Tom Udall, U.S. Sen. N.M., Com-
mittee on Indian Affairs, U.S. Senate). 
256  See Section I.A for the history of federal Indian law and policy. 
257  United States v. Smiskin, 487 F.3d 1260, 1262 (9th Cir. 2007). 
258  Id. at 1270–71. Smiskin involved the construction of a treaty between the federal gov-
ernment and the Yakama Indian Nation and whether the “Right to Travel provision” in the 
treaty exempted members of the Yakama tribe from state regulations on the transportation of 
cigarettes. Id. at 1262. 
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traffic in narcotics. For the government of the United States to be suggesting 
otherwise is irresponsible. 
The Yakama Nation must and will intercede as litigant or amicus to protect its 
members’ treaty right to travel when the federal government overreaches, as it 
has here. But the Nation has no interest in promoting, condoning, or protecting 
activities by its members that pose real dangers to public health, public safety, 
natural resources, or public infrastructure. The Nation has no such interest not 
only because irresponsible overreaching on its part would likely prompt Con-
gress to exercise its constitutional/political power to abrogate or limit the treaty 
right to travel, but also because the Yakama Nation and its members share the 
interest all citizens have in public health, public safety, conservation and equita-
ble exploitation of natural resources, and adequate public infrastructure.259 
The language of the Tribal General Welfare Exclusion Act expresses the 
federal government’s desire to defer to and willingness to consult with tribes on 
creation of policy.260 Despite these enlightened objectives, the language prohib-
iting lavish and extravagant benefits of an Indian tribal government program 
contradicts that deference and emphasizes, at best, a paternalistic or at worst, 
racist approach to interpreting the TGWE. That approach harkens back to earli-
er eras of Indian policy, such as when federal policy focused on the assimila-
tion of individual Indian tribal members and, at worst, the elimination of tribes. 
C. The Prohibition Against Lavish and Extravagant Benefits for Tribal 
Cultural and Religious Traditions is Inconsistent with Current Federal 
Indian Policies Intended to Promote Tribal Sovereignty and Self-
Determination 
Interpreting the prohibition on lavish and extravagant benefits with a sub-
jective standard that varies with each tribe will not ensure that the objectives of 
the TGWE, specifically to promote tribal culture and ceremonial practices, will 
be met. The language prohibiting lavish and extravagant transfers is incon-
sistent with federal Indian policies because it strips tribes of their sovereignty 
and denies them recognition as religious and cultural sovereigns. 
1. Interpreting the Lavish and Extravagant Language as a Subjective 
 
259  Id. at 1271. This same language was quoted by the Supreme Court of Washington State 
in Cougar Den, Inc. v. Washington State Department of Licensing, when the state of Wash-
ington dismissed similar arguments about the “parade of horribles” that could result from 
interpreting a treaty between a tribe and the federal government to provide immunity to the 
tribe from state tax laws of general applicability. 392 P.3d 1014, 1020 (Wash. 2017). In 
Cougar Den, the state of Washington argued that if the court would allow a tribe to escape 
state wholesale fuel taxes the consequences would be that tribal members could also avoid 
prosecution under state laws for possession of firearms by felons. Id. at 1019; see also Ap-
pellant’s Opening Brief at 33, Cougar Den, Inc. v. Washington State Dep’t of Licensing, 392 
P.3d 1014 (Wash. 2017) (No. 92289-6). 
260  Tribal General Welfare Exclusion Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-168, 128 Stat. 1883 
(creation of Tribal Advisory Committee); I.R.C. § 139E (2018) (stating Indian law canons of 
construction applies). 
20 NEV. L.J. 651 
Spring 2020] TAX BURDENS AND TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY 689 
Standard Under the TGWE is not Enough to Promote Tribal 
Ceremonial and Cultural Practices 
The prohibition on lavish and extravagant travel expenses is a subjective 
inquiry that depends on the particularized business.261 Because the application 
of the canons of construction in Indian law to the federal tax statutory language 
prohibiting lavish and extravagant benefits requires that the ambiguities in the 
statute are to be construed in the favor of the tribes and with deference to the 
tribes, one interpretation could be that the limitation is rendered a judgment of 
the tribe. If this was the case, a tribe making such a distribution could just meet 
the standard by proclaiming the benefits not lavish and extravagant under the 
circumstances. As explained below, however, a subjective standard for tribes to 
declare what constitutes lavish and extravagant internal to their own tribe does 
not promote self-determination and sovereignty. 
2. The Existence of the Limitation of Lavish and Extravagant Benefits is, 
Itself, Inconsistent with Federal Indian Policies in Favor of Self-
Determination and Tribal Sovereignty 
a. The Portion of the TGWE to Promote Participation in Ceremonial 
and Cultural Practices is a Measure to Make Reparations for the 
Federal Government’s Historical Attempts to Eradicate Tribal 
Religious and Cultural Practices 
In light of the federal government’s history of attempting to eliminate tribal 
culture, language, and religion, it seems particularly appropriate to shield from 
federal taxation any payments to tribal members by their Indian tribal govern-
ment pursuant to the tribe’s prioritization of language, cultural, or ceremonial 
retention or development.262 The history of the federal government’s attempts 
to eradicate tribal culture and religious practices, particularly of the Termina-
tion Era, is instructive here. If the federal government limits the distributions 
made by tribes for ceremonial participation by prohibiting lavish and extrava-
gant transfers, then the federal government is not fully making reparations for 
the past transgressions, nor is the federal government fully and unconditionally 
encouraging such practices. 
b. Indian Tribes are Cultural Sovereigns and Ought to be Entitled to 
Autonomy to Make Determinations as to What Transfers are 
Appropriate for Cultural and Ceremonial Practices. 
Indian nations are not just political sovereigns. The Indian Civil Rights Act 
does not incorporate the Establishment Clause from the federal Bill of 
 
261  See supra notes 220–21 and accompanying text. 
262  Affiliated Tribes of Northwest Indians et al., Joint Comments on IRS Notice 2012-75, 
18. 
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Rights.263 Tribes function as religious and cultural sovereigns, in addition to 
political sovereigns. Therefore, any analogies between tribes and state and local 
governments are of limited value. 
The proper view of tribal sovereignty is not just political independence, but 
also allowing tribes to have complete independence over cultural and religious 
practices. In the context of the TGWE, a number of tribes have taken the posi-
tion that they should not be burdened by the concept of tax implications when 
practicing their traditional practices and cultures, asking for the IRS to “yield 
its jurisdiction where tribal cultural activities begin.”264 Furthermore, participa-
tion in traditional culture and ceremony “hold deeper meaning to American In-
dian and Alaska Native peoples than other equally important priorities, because 
they speak to tribal peoples’ identity as human beings.”265 
Any limitation by the federal government as to what types of distributions 
would be taxable or exempt from tax acts as a constraint on the ultimate reli-
gious and cultural sovereignty of a tribe. Although the federal government 
could argue that tribes are still permitted to make distributions that are lavish 
and extravagant with the recipient being subject to tax, such an argument over-
looks the meaning of sovereignty. Tribes, especially in the religious and cultur-
al context, deserve ultimate independence.266 
c. The Prohibition on Lavish and Extravagant Benefits Ignores 
Cultural Differences Between Tribes and Non-Tribal Society 
Tribes, through individual members and as sovereign entities, have a histo-
ry of engaging in transfers that are not the same as European-type commercial 
arrangements.267 For example, tribal governments have historically engaged in 
“potlatch” culture, that included ceremonial gifting of items of value to ensure 
equal distribution of assets and ensure survival during times of scarcity.268 
The inherent problem with the federal government seeking to impose tax 
consequences on lavish and extravagant transfers between tribes and their 
members, while exempting modest transfers, is that the federal government as-
sumes European/colonial construct of economic transfers and ignores the cul-
tural context in which the transfers are being made. 
 
263  See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
264  Affiliated Tribes of Northwest Indians, supra note 262, at 18. 
265  Id. 
266  There are statutory safeguards in place to curb potential avenues for abuse, such as dis-
tributions of per capita gaming proceeds. See supra notes 238–43 and accompanying text. 
267  See Ann M. Carlos & Frank D. Lewis, Native Americans, Exchange, and the Role of 
Gift-Giving, in UNLOCKING THE WEALTH OF INDIAN NATIONS 39 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 
2016). The literature on economic transfers and market trade among Indians is well estab-
lished and shows values of reciprocity and redistribution.  
268  Id. at 49. 
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Studies on American Indian trade and economies have been resoundingly 
criticized for lacking cultural understanding and cultural construct.269 While 
some scholarly ethnographic studies on American Indian trade have attempted 
to “identify cultural constructs that informed the conduct of economic activity,” 
much of the work focused on normative information and not addressing “the 
wider political economic contexts of reciprocity and redistribution.”270 
Studies on the religious practices of American Indian tribes have likewise 
been criticized as failing to “adequately represent the complexity of native reli-
gious life.”271 This failure is in part because of “cross-cultural translation,” and 
because of “the denial of the legitimacy of native peoples to practice native re-
ligions.”272 
Failures from an ethnographical or anthropological perspective to fully un-
derstand and appreciate both the economic transfers and the spiritual practices 
of American Indian tribes support the argument that the federal government, 
with its European notions of economic transfers, should not impose standards 
regarding the transfers between tribes and their members, especially in the con-
text of tribal cultural practices.273 
CONCLUSION 
The TGWE, a new federal tax statute that allows tribal members an exclu-
sion from gross income for Indian general welfare benefits, including payments 
made for participation in “cultural or ceremonial activities for the transmission 
of tribal culture,” serves as social policy to promote and encourage tribal reli-
gious and cultural expression. The TGWE is intended to ameliorate a history of 
aggressive and unfair tax enforcement issues in Indian Country and to promote, 
in part, participation in tribal cultural and ceremonial practices. However, the 
statutory language that states excludable welfare benefits cannot be “lavish and 
 
269  Patricia Albers, Labor and Exchange in American Indian History, in A COMPANION TO 
AMERICAN INDIAN HISTORY 278 (Philip J. Deloria & Neal Salisbury eds., 2002) (“Although 
some neoclassical economists and evolutionary ecologists continue to explain American In-
dian labor and exchange through an essentialist discourse, most historians and ethnographers 
of the fur trade have weighed in against this mode of interpretation. The debates over the 
economic ‘rationality’ of American Indian conduct in indigenous and fur trade contexts are 
not likely to be resolved until there are more refined analyses of the linguistic and cultural 
constructs within which the fur trade and native economic activity more generally were situ-
ated.”). 
270  Id. at 272. 
271  Lee Irwin, Native American Spirituality: History, Theory, and Reformulation, in A 
COMPANION TO AMERICAN INDIAN HISTORY 104 (Philip J. Deloria & Neal Salisbury eds., 
2002). 
272  Id. 
273  Hearings, supra note 18, at 54 (Statement of William Lomax, President of NAFOA) 
(“[T]he IRS is making these determinations case-by-case, without integrating Federal Indian 
policy into their decisions. This has the effect of placing Tribal well-being, culture, and val-
ues in the hands of field agencies who routinely make these determinations, instead of duly 
elected Tribal leaders, Congress, and the Administration.”). 
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extravagant” is inconsistent with the statute’s purposes. The prohibition of lav-
ish and extravagant transfers is also inconsistent with federal Indian policies of 
promoting self-determination and tribal sovereignty. As such, the prohibition of 
lavish and extravagant transfers should be removed from the statutory language 
or ignored completely in enforcement as it is an untenable standard. 
